Diversity in Political Parties in Germany

Desk Research and Empirical Report for the EU-Project DIVPOL
„Diversity in Political Parties‘ Programmes, Organisation and Representation“

CJD Hamburg + Eutin

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1. Introduction of the Desk Research

Migration has intensively marked the history of post-war Germany. While the late 1940s and early 1950s were dominated by war related migration (German refugees and expellees), labour market processes – high economic growth and internal labour shortages – led to institutionalized recruitments of foreign “guest workers” (Gastarbeiter). Until 1973, when due to the oil crisis the recruitment was stopped, the West German government signed agreements for labour migration with Italy, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Morocco, Portugal, Tunisia and Yugoslavia. Since the 1970s family reuniﬁcation has become another major channel of immigration to Germany. Thus, these former guest workers and their descendents (in the 2nd and 3rd generation) constitute one of the main populations with migration background in Germany.¹

After the fall of the Iron Curtain a new phase of German migration history started when a large number of eastern Europeans came to the federal territory; among them a lot of ethnic Germans. Nowadays 3.2 out of 4.5 million of these so called Aussiedler and Spätaussiedler live in Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012: 7).

Another large group of immigrants are asylum seekers and refugees. Forced migration to Germany increased in the 1980ies and reached its top with more than 500 000 applications for asylum in the early 1990ies when forced migration was contained by asylum policy (“Asylkompromiss” in 1993). Since that time the amount of applications for asylum declined continuously and just started to increase slightly since 2007. Nevertheless, between 1990 and the end of 2010 2.364 millions of people – originating from countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, Serbia, Turkey and Yugoslavia – sought for political asylum in Germany (Migrationsbericht, 2011: 114).

As a result of these immigration processes, the population with migration background is continuously increasing. According to the data of the Micro-Census 2011, out of 81.8 million 16 million people in Germany have a migration background: 7.2 million (8.8%) are foreigners and 8.8 million (10.7%) are German citizens with migration background, whereas 10.7 million have made migration experiences by themselves (two-thirds of the people with migration background) and 5.3 million haven’t made migration experiences by themselves.

Europe is the most important region of origin and Turkey, Poland, Russia, Kazakhstan and Italy the most import countries of origin. 11.3 million (70.6%) of the people with migration background have a European origin; 5 million (31.3%) of them originate from an EU-27-country and 6.3 million (39.4%) from another European country; 1.2 million (7.5%) have Russian and 3 million (18.8%) have Turkish routs (cp. Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012: 54). According to Eurostat-data currently 4.7 million (2011: 4.6 million) TCN are living in Germany.

In general, a demographic change in form of a declining population and agrowing life expectancy takes place in Germany (Sachverständigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, 2011). Compared to the population without migration background the population with migration background is signiﬁcantly younger (35.2 vs. 46.1 years) and the proportion of men is higher (50.3 vs. 48.8%). Among the under-5-years old persons, 34.9% of the German population have a migration background (cp. Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012: 8).

Although it is a fact that Germany is since a very long time the most important immigration nation within Europe, first in 2005, when the New Immigration Law became effective, Germany become officially an immigration country. Little by little the transformation from an emigration into an immigration country becomes manifest – even it was denied politically for a very long time. Thus, in Ger-

¹ CJD uses the definition of migration background of the Mikrozensus of the Federal Statistical Office; i.e. every person is considered as a person with migration background that immigrated to Germany after 1949, was born in Germany as a foreigner or has at least one immigrated parent or a parent who was born as foreigner (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2011: 6).
many the integration of the population with migration background comes more and more in the public fore and the lacking intercultural openness of German public administration and (political) institutions is raised as an issue and challenge that needs to be solved (cp. Bundesregierung, 2012).

One of the significant lacks of the integration and incorporation of migrants into the German society is the **high underrepresentation of people with migration background within German parliament and political parties**. Also the federal government’s Commissioner for Migration, Refugees and Integration objects that the opportunities for political participation of migrants are far from being fulfilled (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung, 2012: 177).

For though the human rights listed in the German Basic Law apply for all person living in Germany, foreigners are (Article 116, Basic Law) excluded from civic rights (Wiedemann, 2006: 264). This is not only a democratic-theoretical but also a problem in terms of the “valuable contribution to receiving societies (taxes, labour, enriching cultural landscape)” (Adamson, 2007: 5) that migrants undertake and that legitimates according to Adamson (ibid.) their need and demand for political participation (cp. Müssig and Worbs 2012).

Not only on the occasion of the Bundestag election (national parliament) taking place in September 2013 but also some years before when installing 2010 Özkan as integration minister and McAllister as prime minister of Lower Saxony, also the traditional middle-class parties of CDU/CSU and FDP start to intercultural open themselves (MiGAZIN, 2012; Wüst 2011b: 122, Wüst and Saalfeld 2010, see also chapter 5).

After outlining the legal prerequisites and regulations of the political system in Germany and in political parties, the report will give an overview about the research on the political participation of migrants and present the current data about the actual status of representation of migrants within German parliaments. The final chapters look at the ethnic diversity related approaches, debates, strategies and awareness within political parties.

### 2. Legal prerequisites and regulations within the political system and parties

#### Political system in Germany

Since Germany is a **federal parliamentary republic** the federal legislative power is splitted at national level into the Bundestag (national parliament) and the Bundesrat (national organ for the participation of the federal states). The Federal Chancellor (currently Angela Merkel) is not directly elected by the people but by the German Bundestag. Germany comprises 16 federal states (3 city states and 13 territorial states) which are divided into several municipalities.

Within the political system in Germany political parties play a central role (Wüst 2011); also because there is a **multi-party system** which is divided into two factions (a liberal-conservative and a centre-left) and dominated by five parties: the Christian Democratic Union / Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CDU/CSU), The Free Democratic Party (FDP – the Liberals), the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), the Left and the Green Party. Usually, (federal state and national) governments are constituted by coalitions of mostly two of these parties. At the moment the German Federal Government is formed by CDU/CSU and the Liberals.

The **voting system** is relative complicated in Germany: Elections take place on the municipal, on federal state, on national and on European level. Since there is a system of personalized proportional representation at national and partly at federal state level every voter has two votes through which she or he can vote a party and a direct candidate of her / his electoral district.

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2 Political participation e.g. as defined by Verba: “By political participation we refer simply to activity that has the intent or effect of influencing government action – either directly by affecting the making or implementation of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selection of people who make those policies” (Verba et al., 1995). However, this report concentrates on the membership within political parties, resp. participation in parliaments as elected office holder.

3 Aygül Özkan was until February 2013 minister for social affairs, women, family and integration. She was the first migrant woman (of Muslim faith) who became a federal state minister.
Legal prerequisites to vote and to naturalisation

On the national as well as regional level, only German nationals are allowed to vote and to be voted for. In municipal elections as well as the European election, all EU-nationals also have the right to vote in Germany. TCN are excluded from voting in Germany in all elections; they have no voting rights in Germany and cannot participate in the country’s political system.

In general, the right to vote can be distinguished on the one hand in an active voting right, i.e. the right to actually vote for a candidate in an election, and on the other hand a passive electoral right, i.e. the eligibility to stand in an election as a candidate and to be voted for.

The legal prerequisites to vote (and to be voted for) differ in Germany according to:

1) the level of the election (national, regional, local or EU-level) and
2) the state (Bundesland) – for regional and local elections.

The Federal Electoral Law (Bundeswahlgesetz) lays down the rules and regulations for the national elections. In Clause 12 (1) it states that: “All Germans within the meaning of Article 116, Paragraph (1) of the Basic Law shall be entitled to vote, provided that on the day of the election they 1. have reached the age of 18 years, 2. have had a domicile or have otherwise been permanently resident for at least three months in the Federal Republic of Germany, and 3. are not disqualified from voting under Article 13”. Similar regulations apply for the passive electoral right: The only difference is that there is no obligation to have been resident in Germany for at least three months and that a person loses their right to be elected “when he or she has been deprived by judicial decision of eligibility to stand for parliament or of qualification to hold public office” (Federal Electoral Law § 15).

Every German state has its own Electoral Law which applies for elections on the regional level. The State Electoral Laws do not differ much from the federal one. However, there are three German states – Brandenburg, Bremen and Hamburg – which grant active voting rights to people from the age of 16. Passive electoral rights differ: Whereas usually, the age limit is 18 and people are required to have lived at least three months in the state, some demand six months or even a year. The state of Hesse has the strictest rules allowing people who are over 21 and have lived in the state for one year to stand for regional election.

The Municipal Electoral Law lies within the responsibility of the states. For municipal elections, nine out of the 16 states allow people from the age of 16 to actively vote⁴; in the remaining states, the age limit is 18 years. On the municipal level, everyone with a German- or an EU-nationality can vote and stand for election. The same holds true for European elections: According to the European Elections Act, all German- and EU-nationals over the age of 18 who have lived in Germany/ the EU for at least three months are allowed to vote; the minimum time of residency does not apply for passive voting rights.

In order to vote in any election, all voters have to be registered in the electoral roll. In Germany, this registration happens automatically based on the data of the registration offices – with one exception: EU-nationals who want to vote in Germany in the European election have to file an application in order to be entered in the German electoral roll. They are allowed to vote in one EU member state and thereby declare where to exercise their voting right.

As has been pointed out, TCNs are not allowed to vote in any election in Germany; there are, however, several possibilities for TCN to take part in the political decision-making process, for instance:

⁴ These nine states are Berlin, Brandenburg, Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Mecklenburg-Hither Pomerania, North Rhine-Westphalia, Saxony-Anhalt and Schleswig-Holstein.
1) **Foreigners’ or Migration or Integration Advisory Councils**: On the local level, in many municipalities, advisory councils can or must be installed; the regulations differ according to the state (*Bundesland*): In some cases there is an election and foreign nationals can vote and stand as candidates; in other cases, the members of the council are appointed by the municipal government. These advisory councils are usually responsible for all matters concerning the municipality’s inhabitants with foreign nationality or a migration background as well as topics like immigration, integration, communal life or social cohesion. Nevertheless, advisory councils can only present proposals and file petitions – and still, the municipal government finally decides on the proposals.

2) **(Migrant) Organisations**: TCN can also found and/or join organisations in Germany. There are many migrant organisations dealing with specific issues of the population with a migration background – often differentiated according to countries of origins – representing their members’ interests towards politics. General organisations as well can offer a means to TCN to stand up for their interests – in particular when these organisations form coalitions such as the Federal Society of Immigrant Associations in Germany (BAGIV).

3) **(Local) Initiatives**: There are various initiatives mainly on the local, but also on the regional, national or EU-level aiming at representing interests and influencing public opinion. Such initiatives or campaigns usually follow a low-threshold approach and do not discriminate their members according to a foreign nationality. TCN can also start initiatives and campaigns.

4) **Political Parties**: Almost all political parties permit TCN to become members (for further information see below). By joining, TCN can bring in their ideas and get access to internal decision-making processes. They can vote within the parties as well and, thus, decide on who will stand in elections. However, in order to get nominated and stand as candidate in elections, TCN have to become German nationals.

Currently, the only way for TCN to participate in elections is to obtain the German nationality. **Legal prerequisites to naturalisation** are defined in Germany in the Nationality Act (*Staatsangehörigkeitsgesetz*). There was a major change in the Nationality Act in the year 2000 which facilitated naturalisation. In order to become a German national, a foreigner must file an application and has to, according to Nationality Act, § 8 and 10:

- have lived at least for eight years in Germany
- have a secured residence permit
- have not been sentenced for an unlawful act and is not subject to any court order imposing a measure of reform and prevention
- have found a dwelling of his or her own or accommodation
- be able to support him- or herself and his or her dependants
- give up his or her previous citizenship

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5 In most states, the advisory councils are teamed up in state working groups. 13 of them are members of the Federal Migration and Integration Advisory Council (*Bundeszuwanderungs- und Integrationsrat*), which, thus, represents more than 400 member organisations (see also: [http://www.bundesintegrationsrat.de/](http://www.bundesintegrationsrat.de/)).

6 There are several exceptions to this rule, e.g. concerning EU citizens or people whose countries of origins do not dismiss their citizens.
possess an adequate knowledge of the German language and of the legal system, the society as well as the living conditions in Germany.

Naturalisation proceedings in Germany are subject to a charge; applicants can, however, apply for a reduction or remission of the fees. With the change of the German Immigration Act (Zuwanderungsgesetz) in 2005, foreigners either can or have to participate in German language and integration courses. When they successfully pass these courses, the minimum residency in Germany reduces from eight to seven years (Storz and Wilmes, 2007a). Since September 2008, foreigners applying for the German citizenship also have to successfully pass the naturalisation test.

Data shows that there were 7.268 million foreigners in Germany in 2011; almost 106,900 people got naturalised in this year. This number is up from about 94,500 in 2008. After the change of law in 2000 with about 186,700 naturalisations, there had been mainly a decline in the numbers. Still, the changed law had a positive effect on the numbers. Since then, the Federal Bureau of Statistics (Statistisches Bundesamt) has a quota on the naturalisation potential. In 2000, 4.9% of all foreigners eligible for naturalisation actually got naturalised. In 2011, this quota lies at 2.3% (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012: 15).

The Nationality Act of 2000 also includes new rules and regulations concerning foreigners' children who were born in Germany: When one parent is a German national, the child gets both nationalities – the German one and the other parent’s nationality – and can keep both of them. A child who is born in Germany to parents with foreign nationalities of whom at least one has been a legal resident of Germany for at least eight years and has been granted a permanent right of residency gets the German citizenship. When he or she turns 18, he or she gets five years to decide which citizenship to keep. The process is called option obligation (Optionspflicht) and is currently widely discussed by experts, practitioners and politicians, since it might cause problems for the young persons concerned.

The above mentioned discussion is also related to a long-standing public debate on dual citizenship (see e.g. Naujoks, 2009). Germany actually requires applicants to give up their foreign nationality. There are, however, many exceptions to that rule. In 2011, 50.4% of all naturalised persons could keep their foreign nationality and, thus, have a dual citizenship (Statistisches Bundesamt 2012: 147). All parties except of the CDU/CSU are in favour of the dual citizenship. Among other things, the obligation to give up the foreign nationality is seen as a major reason for foreigners not to apply for naturalisation (see e.g. Weinmann et al, 2012: 31).

For years there has been another public debate; it concerns voting rights on the municipal level for TCNs. In 1998 the ruling coalition between the Social Democrats and the Greens stated in their coalition agreement their will to implement municipal voting rights for TCN. However, they always lacked the necessary two-thirds majority in both the Bundestag (German Federal Parliament) and Bundesrat (Federal Council of Germany). Many municipalities and NGOs support and demand voting rights for TCNs on the local level. The Green and the Left Party as well as the Social Democrats are in favour of these voting rights (although the SPD voted against it when in coalition with the CDU/CSU), whereas the CDU/CSU reject any attempts to implement it. In a position paper concerning integration matters in 2009 the Christian Democratic Union wrote: “The CDU does not approve a right to vote on the municipal level for foreigners, because that does not establish full participation as citizens. We make the case for foreigners who have been living and working in Germany for years and who are well integrated to use the option to obtain German citizenship instead. […] The CDU rejects a general
acceptance of dual citizenship” (CDU, 2009). The possibility of naturalisation is a major argument for opponents of a municipal voting right for TCN. However, as shown in the paragraphs above, only a small percentage of foreigners who meet the requirements for naturalisation also become German citizens.

Legal prerequisites to joining a political party

The prerequisites for joining a political party are defined in the parties’ statutes. For the five major political parties in Germany – which are represented in the Bundestag (German Federal Parliament) – the following regulations apply: All parties require their (potential) members to follow their basic principles and objectives; at the same time they do not allow membership in another political party. A membership fee must be paid, usually depending on the member’s income (roughly about 1% of the net income – less for people with a lower income and usually a higher percentage for members who earn more). Four of these parties – with the exception of the Greens – request a minimum age, which is 14 years for the Social Democrats and the Left and 16 years for the Christian Democratic/ Social Union and the Liberals. Furthermore, CDU/CSU and the Liberals prohibit people who lost their active and passive voting rights to join the party.

With regard to allowing third country nationals (TCNs) to become members, the regulations among the five major parties differ: The Social Democrats, the Left and the Greens do not have any limitations for TCN to join the party, i.e. people who want to join the party do not need German citizenship or citizenship of another EU member state. By contrast, CDU/CSU and the Liberals restrict the access of TCN to full membership of the parties. The Liberals require TCN to have lived at least two years in Germany before they can join the party; their statutes also state that a foreigner’s membership ends when he/she moves away from Germany. According to the statutes of the Christian Democratic as well as the Christian Social Union, TCN who want to join the parties have to prove that they have lived in Germany for at least three years before they are allowed to do so.

Furthermore, CDU/CSU, the Social Democrats and the Left offer so-called guest memberships to people who are interested in joining the party. In order to become a guest member, a person has to follow the parties’ principles and objectives and cannot be member of another political party. Guest members are allowed to participate in the party’s general meetings and have the right to speak, the right of petition and of proposal there. They are, however, prohibited from taking part in internal elections and referenda. With exception of the Social Democrats, guest memberships are free of charge and end after one year (two years for the SPD). In the Christian Social Union guest membership of TCNs ends when they are allowed to become full members of the party and can, thus, last longer than one year.

Next to consultative bodies, public funding or support of migrant organisations, and the right to associate and to create media for TCN in Germany, the fact that political parties in Germany are theoretically open towards migrants is one of the main reasons why the MIPEX for Germany states that there are slightly favourable conditions for the political participation (64%, position 8 out of 31, MIPEX 2007, 2010). The political participation MIPEX could be nevertheless significant higher, if TCN would get have access to electoral rights in Germany.  

8 All parties’ statutes and programmes can be downloaded from the website of the Federal Returning Officer (Bundeswahlleiter) at http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de.
9 These five parties are: the Christian Democratic Union/ Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU), the Social Democratic Party (SPD), the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Left Party (DIE LINKE) and the Green Party (BÜNDNIS 90/ DIE GRÜNEN).
10 http://www.mipex.eu/
3. Overview research

Within the German debate about the political participation of immigrants the focus was and is still on civic engagement and participation within migrant organisations (Cyrus, 2008a; Huth, 2007; Weiss and Tränhardt, 2005).

While for a long period a negative impact of the participation in “home-based” migrant organisations on the integration process was assumed, transnational political active migrants and migrant organizations are nowadays increasingly considered as important political actors within the international political system (Faist 2000, Pries 2005).

Since the 1960ies but especially during the 1980ies the majority of the studies dealt with the chances and rights for political participation of migrants at municipal level and discussed the introduction and the impact of so called Foreigners Advisory Council (Ausländerbeiräte). There is widespread agreement that “Ausländerbeiräte” is an ineffective instrument to support the participation of migrants within political decision-making processes at municipal level (Hunger/Candan, 2009: 5).

In the 1980ies and 1990ies the right to vote in local, federal state and national elections for foreigners was discussed predominantly by jurists under constitutional perspective (Thränhardt 1985). After the extension of the German right to vote were denied by the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in 1990, the right to vote in local election was introduced for EU-citizen in the context of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. So, 1994 EU-citizen could vote in local elections in Germany. In the same year Leyla Onur (SPD) and Cem Özdemir (Green Party) became as first guest workers’ children members of the German Bundestag (Hunger and Candan, 2010: 5 f.).

Even the National Integration Plan (NIP) of 2007 gives civic engagement a high priority within the support of the integration of immigrants but mentions the political participation only randomly insofar as it recommends – without obligations – to prove the introduction of municipal right to vote for TCNs (Cyrus, 2008a).

Nevertheless, TCN are still completely excluded from the right to vote (s. chapter 3) what Schulte (2009) criticized as a disregard of human rights (the right to participate and to co-decide in the country of residence). Hence, he advocates a municipal right to vote that is not orientated towards citizenship but towards the length of stay. Furthermore he also recommends a facilitation of naturalization and a flexibilisation of the dual citizenship. Both were often discussed during the last two decades and very partly implemented by reforms of the citizenship law (1998, 2000).

All in all, the discrepancy between the proportion of immigrants in the population and their representation within political parties and parliaments is discussed as a democratic deficit. While in the past the extension of the right to vote in local elections and the extension of the competences of the “Ausländerbeirat” (s. chapter 3) were demanded by academics, these strategies are nowadays considered as non-sufficient because there are still too many people excluded in participating completely in the political system in Germany. From the point of view of democracy theory, permission of dual citizenship, the extension of the right to vote for TCNs and the naturalisation of foreigners are considered ideal ways to guarantee the political integration of migrants.

Hence, currently the Germany debate focuses “on whether to allow dual citizenship and how tough the naturalisation process should be. The possibility of having dual citizenship encourages applications for naturalisation and the consequent access to political rights” (Castro Nacarino, 2012: 7).

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11 There are still very few studies about transnationalism in Germany.
Effects of the unequal treatment of German citizen, EU- and Non-EU-citizen (TCNs) are the emergence of dissatisfaction among migrants, turning away from politics and reorientation towards countries of origin (Hunger/Candan, 2010: 17; Sen and Karakasoglu, 1996; Assemenios, 2001; Kasdanatassi, 2001; Roderich, 2009).

Another result of this exclusion is that many political parties miss to address migrant interests and needs. However, since the naturalized population is increasing and amounts already 2.2 million persons (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012: 8), political parties are forced to target migrants. Especially after the transformation of the citizenship law in 2000 and the increase of naturalization, political parties have less opportunity to ignore migrants, especially when they do not want to lose valuable electoral votes.

In the last decade, a new branch of research forms the investigation of the political attitude people with migration background and the voting behaviour of naturalised persons. Andreas Wüst, who is the director of the current research project “migrants as political actors” at Mannheimer Zentrum für europäische Sozialforschung (financed by the VW-foundation, on-going project, duration: 2006 to 2013), conducted an important pioneer study in 2002.

He identifies in this study a significant polarisation of party preferences by different migrant groups: While naturalized people from former Soviet Union, Poland and Rumania tend to vote right of the centre, voters with Turkish origin prefer parties left of the centre. Wüst explains this polarisation with cultural differences resp. religious cleavages. Another finding is that with an increased integration level the differences between native and naturalised Germans electoral behaviour disappear.

Another important study was undertaken by Weidacher (2000) and focuses - like some other studies do – on the political attitude of youth with migration background. One of the outcomes to be highlighted are that the impact of the social status – like the income and educational level of the parents – on the political attitude is much more significant than the migration background.

Another result of the exclusion is demonstrated by the very low level of representation of migrants within political parties and parliaments. Unfortunately the rates of members with migration background within political parties are not captured (s. chapter 5). However, the strong underrepresentation in the public administration as well as in political institutions becomes increasingly an issue discussed in politics, public administration and civil society and the demand for IKÖ (intercultural opening) gets louder wherefore IKÖ became a part of the National Integration Plan (Hessisches Ministerium der Justiz, für Integration und Europa, 2012).

Since the middle of the 2000ies career paths of politicians and the important role of political parties for the political representation of migrants become an object of research (Wüst and Heinz, 2009; Wüst and Saalfeld, 2010; Schönwälder et al., 2011; Schmitz and Wüst, 2011; Herbolsheimer and Wüst, 2012).

Wüst and Heinz (2009) asserts that the number of elected office holder with migration background has increased on all political level in the last years (especially in the SPD, Greens, Left, but not so significant in the CDU/CSU and FDP). Like politicians without migration background from electoral districts with a high share of migrant population, most of the migrant parliamentarians have their working focus on migration policies.

This finding corresponds with the findings of Schönwälder who is the director of a research project about “Immigrants in German city councils” (between 2001 and 2011) at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity (financed by Heinrich-Böll-Foundation and Mercator Foundation).
A clear majority of the councillors interviewed indicates that they are considered as experts for migration policy questions and criticizes that this role ascription and the expectations of the parties that politicians with migration background automatically do migration and integration politics. Altogether, migration policy as a key work area is seen ambivalent. On the one hand, this political area is considered as a door opener topic to politics, on the other hand many councillors verbalised the apprehension that it might be also a blind alley since migration policy is not a dominant policy area (cp. Sinanoglu and Volkert, 2011: 8).

Schönwälder (2011) as well as Cyrus (2008b) emphasized that many elected office holder were before they became a member of a political party were engaged in Ausländerberäte / Integrationsräte or migrant organisations.

Many scientists assume that the topic “migrants within political parties” will become increasingly present because more and more eligible voters have a migration background (Wüst and Heinz, 2009; Da Fonseca 2006a, 2006b; Cyrus 2007). Thus, by now all of the political parties that are playing a role within the national politics not only aim to improve the integration of migrants in the society but also to run candidates with migration background and to take them into account when positioning exclusive offices (Wüst 2011b, cp. chapter 5). Because if they miss to solicit the support of citizen with migration background programmatically and manned, they will lose important and competitive votes (ibid.).

In conclusion, there is a change observable within the scientific research about political participation of migrants in Germany. While in the beginning (1960ies-1980ies) the predominantly juristic research focused on the compatibility of a reform of the Electoral Law (that does not exclude migrants without the German citizenship) with the German national and federal state constitutions, nowadays the core research area is a psephology in which naturalized people play an important group of voters. Hunger and Candan (2010: 23) call this a normalization of the migration relation within Germany because in former research democratic-theoretical and classic state-philosophic approaches dominated and the democratic deficit and the exclusion of migrants via citizenship from important parts in processes of forming the political will was problematized. In contrast, in recent, more pragmatic research about the electoral behaviour and political careers methodological a more quantitative orientation is significant.

List of main institutes of research and foundations

- **Mannheim Centre for European Social Research (MZES)**
  
  Project: *Migrants as Political Actors*
  
  Director: Andreas D. Wüst
  
  Funding: VW-Foundation
  
  Duration: 2006 to 2013 (ongoing)
  

- **Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity**
  
  Project: *Political Institutions and the Challenge of Diversity*
  
  Director: Karen Schönwälder
  
  Duration: on-going

12
Sub-Project: *Immigrants in German City Councils*
Funding: Heinrich-Böll-Foundation, Mercator Foundation
Duration: till 2011

Sub-Project: *Immigrants in German Politics: Local Elections and Local Parliaments in North Rhine-Westphalia*
Duration: till 2010

On-going sub-projects:
- *Political Parties and diversity at the local level: a comparison between Berlin and Paris*
- *Local Councillors with Migration Background: The Role of Migration Background and Ethnicity for their Political Practices*

- **Centre for European Studies** (CES) that is a political foundation of the European People’s Party (EPP)

- **Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation** (FES)
- **Heinrich-Böll-Foundation**
- **Mercator Foundation**
- **VW-Foundation**
- **Bertelsmann-Foundation**
- **Foundation for Participation** (StiftungMitarbeit) with its Project Guide to Civil Society Germany (»WegweiserBürgergesellschaft«) that support civic engagement
- **Federal Association of Immigrant Organizations in Germany** („Bundesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Immigrantenverbände in Deutschland e.V.“) that is a national and multinational umbrella association of migrant organisations and has the aim to represent the interests of immigrants while promoting integration

4. **Actual state of representation in the major political parties**

Migrants sitting in the current national parliament as representatives of their parties

Even though the political representation and participation of people with migration background is very low, over the last three decades the **amount of German parliamentarians with migration background increased**. According to Wüst (2011a) in 1990 only 5 elected office holders within federal state parliaments, the national parliament (Bundestag) and European parliament had a migration biography, while in the end of 2011 there were already 90 politicians with migration background sitting in the European, the German national or in a federal state parliament.
Wüst (2011a) as well as Schönwälder (2010; cp. also Schönwälder et al., 2011) also asserts a clear gap between the political camps: While the centre-right and the liberal party (bürgerliche Parteien: CDU, FDP) tend to have only very few office holders with migration background, the centre-left, the left and the green party (the Left, the Greens) have in comparison significant more office holder with migration background. Historically the Greens are deemed to be a pioneer, since they started to have migrant politicians sitting in (state) parliaments in the late 1980ies. Their relative openness towards migrants is caused by not only the engagement of migrants themselves but also by the self-concept of the Greens as a party that has always welcomed immigration.

Out of 620 parliamentarians, the current German Bundestag (national parliament) counts 21 members with a migration background (MiGAZIN, 2009). This means that 3.4% of the members of the Bundestag have a migration biography.

Regarding the proportion of the German population with a migration background which is 19.5% (Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012: 7), a strong political underrepresentation of people with a migrant background has to be stated.

Table 1: Migrant members of the German Bundestag in April 2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Migrant members of a parliamentary group in the German Bundestag</th>
<th>Rate among the members of a parliamentary group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Green Party</td>
<td>6 out of 68</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Left Party</td>
<td>5 out of 75</td>
<td>6.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>4 out of 93</td>
<td>4.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>4 out of 146</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU/CSU</td>
<td>2 out of 237</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own investigation and calculation (CJD Hamburg + Eutin/Markard, April 2013)

Compared to the last legislative period (2005-2009) the total numbers of the parliamentarians with migration background in the national parliament has declined from 23 to 20; at that time the rate of members with a migration background was 3.8%.

While all of the current 20 politicians with migration background in the Bundestag own the German citizenship, 6 of them have an Middle or Eastern European (1 Croatian, 1 Czech, 2 Polish, 1 Slavic, 1 Ukrainian), 5 a Turkish, 4 an Iranian, 3 an Indian, 1 a Belgian and 1 a Spanish background. 30% are members of the 1st and 70% are members of the 2nd generation of migrants.\(^\text{12}\)

More than a half of them are members of the Green or the Left Party. The biggest parliamentary group with 237 members (CDU) has just one member with a migration background.

Migrants sitting in federal state and municipal parliaments as representatives of their parties

In order to compare the actual state of representation within the federal state parliaments CJD made an investigation by scanning the names and biographies of members of territorial and city state par-

\(^{12}\) According to Hämmig (2000), there is a strong lack of clarity about the definition of the 2nd generation within the migration sociological debate. Following Karl Mannheim (1970), members of a generation not only share the age but also a conjunctive and collective context and spaces of experiences. That is why CJD negates a strong statistical generation concept that considers only the place of birth as a criterion for distinguishing the first from the second generation of migrants. While an exact age is not seen as a profound category to define a generation, most of the migration sociologists would agree that a member of the 2nd generation of migrants is a child of immigrants and is either born in Germany or immigrated (with the parents) during the primary socialization (before school enrolment). Hence, CJD orientates towards a generation concept that definition was delivered by Herzog-Punzenberger (2003) and that considers members of the sociological group “2nd generation” as persons who are descendants of immigrants and who are born in Germany or immigrated before school age.
liaments (numbers as of March 2013). Since more than 96% of the German population with migration background lives in the Former West German, so called “Old Federal States” and in Berlin (cp. Statistisches Bundesamt, 2012: 8), the investigation concentrates on the city states (Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg) and on the Former West German Territorial States but also looks at the New / Former East Federal States.

According to this investigation, a **strong difference between city states and territorial states is significant at federal state level**. As shown by Table 2, the average rate of members with migration background within the territorial state parliaments is about 2%, while it is about 11% within the city state parliaments.

**Table 2: Migrant members of state parliaments**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Federal state (governing party, election year)</th>
<th>Migrant members in federal state parliaments (Landtag)</th>
<th>Rate within the Landtag</th>
<th>Share of the population within the federal state</th>
<th>Migrant minister in federal state governments (incl. prime minister)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(Old / Former West German) Territorial states: 21 out of 1038 (2%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lower Saxony (SPD/the Greens, 2013)</td>
<td>7 out of 137</td>
<td>5.1%</td>
<td>17.5%</td>
<td>0 out of 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baden-Württemberg (the Greens/SPD, 2011)</td>
<td>4 out of 138</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
<td>26.2%</td>
<td>1 out of 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hesse (CDU/FDP, 2009)</td>
<td>3 out of 118</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>25.3%</td>
<td>0 out of 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Rhine-Westphalia (SPD/the Greens, 2012)</td>
<td>5 out of 237</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
<td>24.2%</td>
<td>0 out of 13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schleswig-Holstein (SPD/the Greens/SSW, 2012)</td>
<td>1 out of 69</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
<td>12.4%</td>
<td>0 out of 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhineland-Palatinate (SPD/the Greens, 2011)</td>
<td>1 out of 101</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>19.1%</td>
<td>0 out of 10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bavaria (CSU/FDP, 2008)</td>
<td>0 out of 187</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>19.7%</td>
<td>0 out of 12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saarland (CDU/SPD, 2012)</td>
<td>0 out of 51</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>18.1%</td>
<td>0 out of 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City states: 39 out of 353 (11%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bremen (SPD/the Greens, 2011)</td>
<td>14 out of 83</td>
<td>16.9%</td>
<td>28.2%</td>
<td>0 out of 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Berlin (SPD/CDU, 2011)</td>
<td>17 out of 149</td>
<td>11.4%</td>
<td>24.8%</td>
<td>1 out of 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hamburg (SPD, 2011)</td>
<td>8 out of 121</td>
<td>6.6%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>0 out of 11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own investigation and calculation (CJD Hamburg + Eutin/ Markard, April 2013)

In contrast, in the New (Former East German) Federal States there is no minister with migration background but one with a Sorbian Nationality which is one of the accepted National Minorities in Germany and only one of 484 parliamentarians has a migration biography. Hikmat Al-Sabty was born in Iraq and is sitting as member of the Left Party and as the first migrant in the Landtag of Mecklenburg-Vorpommern since 2011.

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13. Caused by this method, the number of migrant parliamentarians is presumably underestimated.
14. Before there were only one politician (Nikolas Sakellarioj) sitting in the Lower Saxon parliament
15. Minister of integration: Bilkay Öney (SPD).
16. Before the federal state election in 2011, 7 out of 181 parliamentarians had a migration background (3.9%); three of them (with Turkish background) were politicians of the left party which is not represented in the current parliament.
17. This is the party of the Danish minority which is one of the national minorities in Germany.
18. Dilek Kolat (SPD) member of the city parliament and senator for labour, integration and women of Berlin.
Compared to the national level, politicians of Turkish descent dominate among the federal state parliamentarians. The majority of the federal state migrant parliamentarians has a Turkish family background and is either member of the Green or member of the Social Democratic Party (see Table 3 and Table 4). The proportion of female federal state parliamentarians with migration background (33.3%, see Table 3) is pretty much the same as that proportion of women within federal state parliaments in general (32.6%, cp. Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg).

Table 3: Migrant politicians with a Turkish background and female politicians with migration / Turkish background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Turkish family background</th>
<th>Women among politicians with Turkish background</th>
<th>Women among politicians with migration background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Territorial state parliamentarians</td>
<td>12 out of 21 (57.1%)</td>
<td>6 out of 12 (50.0%)</td>
<td>7 out of 21 (33.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>City state parliamentarians</td>
<td>25 out of 39 (64.1%)</td>
<td>9 out of 25 (36.0%)</td>
<td>13 out of 39 (33.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td>37 out of 60 (61.7%)</td>
<td>15 out of 37 (40.5%)</td>
<td>20 out of 60 (33.3%)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own investigation and calculation (CJD Hamburg + Eutin/Markard, April 2013)

Table 4: Members of state parliaments with a migration / Turkish background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Members with migration background within federal state parliaments</th>
<th>... with Turkish background</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(Old / Former West German) territorial states</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Greens</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>7 + 1 minister of integration</td>
<td>4 + 1 minister of integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>city states</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>20 (incl. 1 minister of integration)</td>
<td>14 (incl. 1 minister of integration)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Greens</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Left20</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Pirate Party21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Own investigation and calculation (CJD Hamburg + Eutin/Markard, April 2013)

In comparison with the results of Schönwälder (2010), the total amount of federal state parliamentarians with migration as well as the rate has slightly increased during the last two years: While in the end of 2010 Schönwälder counted 46 out of 1825 federal state parliamentarians with migration background, CJD identifies 60 out of 1391 parliamentarians in the Old Federal States and Berlin and 1 out of 484 in the New Federal States with migration biographies (in total: 61 out of 1875).

Schönwälder calculated that 3% of the parliamentarians sitting in Berlins and in the Old Federal States parliaments had a migration background, according to the inquiries of the CJD there are 4.3%

19 [http://www.lpb-bw.de/frauenanteil_laenderparlamenten.html](http://www.lpb-bw.de/frauenanteil_laenderparlamenten.html)
20 The Left is only in Eastern Germany, in Saarland and Hesse and in the city states represented.
21 The Pirate Party is represented in NRW, Schleswig-Holstein, Saarland and Berlin.
(since the end of February 2013). Nevertheless, compared to the share of the population about 22.3% in the Old Federal States and in Berlin there is still a strong underrepresentation of migrants.

Regarding the municipal level, Schönwälder et al. assert in the study “Vielfalt sucht Rat” (2011) that between 2001 and 2006 4% of 4670 members of the city parliaments had a migration biography. Most of the interviewed councillors were naturalized during the 1990ies and obtained their party membership before 2000.

Since 2000 the naturalization was simplified, more and more people with migration background received the German citizenship and so the active and passive right to vote (s. chapter 3). Hence, an increased number of German citizen with migration background constitute a new electorate that influences the election results (cp. Wüst, 2012, 2003). Because this electorate prefers to vote parties left to the centre the centre-right and liberal parties have in particular to develop strategies addressing voters with migration background (Castro Nacarino et al., 2012). One of these strategies consists in intercultural opening.

5. Description of the actual discussion and approach to the issue within political parties

Dealing with diversity in political parties

“The German population is getting smaller, older and more diverse.” (Forum, 2007) This visible result of the demographic change is more and more reflected in organisations and institutions of society. Political parties are the key institutions for political participation and for developing and implementing policies. However, as this report shows, the changing structure of society has not been reflected in the bigger political parties so far. Some parties have always been more open for this topic; others have only recently started to promote integration issues or diversity within the party.

These differences become apparent when looking at the bigger parties’ programmes – basic programmes as well as the election manifestos for the past two federal elections – as well as inner-party groups or party resolutions. All of the five big parties in Germany (respectively six when counting the CSU separately) deal with the issues of immigration, integration and diversity in their programme, mainly in specific sections (see table in Annex). They have, however, different approaches towards these topics. The CDU/CSU emphasises what is demanded of migrants and their descendants more often than how this group’s participation in society can be supported. The Free Democrats have their liberal view on these issues, supporting equal rights and diversity; whereas the Left Party’s view is on the one hand based on equal rights for immigrants, too, and on the other hand influenced by supporting people in need (e.g. refugees) as well as global thinking. The Green Party – and in their latest programme also the SPD – have incorporated the topics in different sections of their programme and, thus, give them a prominent role and underlie their importance. Also, immigration, integration and diversity are not seen in these parties’ programmes as separated topics, but as integral part of all different areas.

Whereas all parties underline the importance of immigration, integration and diversity in different areas of society (mainly education and labour market), of learning the German language and of following the free and democratic principles of the constitution, not all of them emphasise their own role in the process. Nevertheless, some parties explicitly state in their programmes their goal of opening up the party for migrants. The Green Party emphasised in its 2009 election programme, for

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instance, that “people with a migration background have to be motivated to participate in political parties”. They do not, however, describe how to implement this goal.

Furthermore, the centre-left parties as well as the CDU have specific working groups dealing with the topic of immigration and integration as well as – in case of the Left – anti-racism and ethnic minorities. The German-Turkish Forum within the CDU, for instance, is an association established to discuss ways of addressing people with a Turkish background and interest them in the CDU. The respective working group concerned with migration- and integration-related issues in the Left Party published an appeal to support diversity in the party by giving promising places on the party’s list for the next federal election to politicians with a migration background. Whether or not the different branches of the party follow this appeal, will become apparent in the coming months.

The parties’ approaches and activities to deal with and to enhance diversity are again illustrated in Annex, Table 6. Information is based on the parties’ programmes and websites.

Role models

In every bigger party in Germany, there are politicians with a migration background. The more prominent their role within the party is, the more media attention they get. The reports and commentaries are rather positive and often portrait the politician’s background and life story. Often, these delegates are asked to comment on issues such as immigration and integration, though these are not always their topics of interest (see below).

Politicians with a migration background are widely considered to be role models: They are seen as well integrated and dedicated to society. Younger members of parliament with a migration background, i.e. Omid Nouripour (GRÜNE) or Serap Güler (CDU), tell about considering the first politicians with a migration background to make it to the parliament – in particular Cem Özdemir (GRÜNE) – to be their role models. Successful politicians prove to migrants in Germany that everybody can succeed in his or her profession – regardless of whether they or their family have lived in Germany for centuries or have recently immigrated (Deutscher Bundestag, 2009; Tagesspiegel, 2013). The composition of the German population – of which almost one-fifth have a migration background – is gradually becoming more apparent in the public with more delegates with a migration background as well.

Pathways of careers of successful migrants in political parties

People who want to make a career as politicians in Germany (i.e. make it to the top of national or regional parliaments) usually have to climb up the greasy pole and take the slow and hard road to the top, the so-called “Ochsentour”. Politicians ordinarily need to start their career in the local branches of the parties or a party’s youth wings; after several years of working (on a voluntary basis) on the municipal or regional level, they can get nominated as a candidate of the Landtag (state parliament) or Bundestag (federal parliament) (Hartmann, 2004: 22). According to their short biographies, many of the members of the federal parliament with a migration background had been active in their parties on all levels for years (Deutscher Bundestag, 2009).

Lateral entrants into politics (Seiteneinsteiger) – without years of experience on the municipal and regional level – are rather uncommon. However, in recent years, more and more young delegates made their way into the parliaments. Furthermore, the heads of the federal and state parliaments, who are relatively free in choosing their ministers, appointed comparatively young party members. The German minister for family affairs, Kristina Schröder (CDU), for instance, was 32 years old when she became head of the ministry. The first state minister with a migration background, Aygül Özkan (CDU), was 38 when she was appointed as minister for social affairs in Lower Saxony in 2010 (see also chapter 4). Before she became minister, Ms Özkan had been a member of the CDU for six years; she
had been a member of the state parliament in Hamburg since 2008. Some commentators, i.e. in the media, criticise that nominating particularly young politicians or politicians with a migration background constitutes only a “symbolic policy”. They see it as a tactical move to present the party as young and modern and to attract more votes from voters with a migration background; sometimes such candidates can face resentments within the party particularly in difficult situations (Händelsblatt, 2010; Süddeutsche.de, 2010a). A study found out that in particular the centre-right and liberal parties nominate such lateral entrants whereas centre-left parties rather provide promising places on their lists for experienced party members (Wüst, 2011a).

One of the best known and most successful politicians with a migration background is Cem Özdemir, leader of the Green Party. His biography will be shortly presented in the following as an example of the career of a politician with a TCN background.

Mr Özdemir was born in 1965 in a small town in the south west of Germany. His parents emigrated from Turkey to Germany in the early 1960s as so-called guest workers (Gastarbeiter). As a child with a foreign background, he had a rough start at school, faced discrimination and had to work his way up the different school types. Mr Özdemir trained as a child care worker, then completed his vocational baccalaureate diploma (Fachabitur) and studied social pedagogy. When Mr Özdemir turned 18, he obtained the German citizenship.

In 1981, being 16 years old, he became a member of the Greens. Between 1989 and 1994, Mr Özdemir belonged to the party’s regional executive in Baden-Wuerttemberg. In 1994 he became the first member of the federal parliament with a Turkish background and was the Green’s spokesperson for domestic policy (1998 – 2002). Due to a scandal concerning the private usage of frequent flyer miles he gained on business flights as well as a controversial loan from a PR consultant, Mr Özdemir withdrew from politics in 2002 – although he won a parliamentary seat – and moved to the USA and Brussels as a fellow of the German Marshall Fund in the US. He made his comeback in politics in 2004 and became a member of the European Parliament. His candidature for the German Bundestag in 2009 was not successful: The Baden-Württemberg regional branch of the Greens did not nominate him for a leading position of its list for the federal election and by gaining about 30% of the votes in his constituency he did not win the direct mandate either. Nevertheless, Mr Özdemir run as a candidate for the Green’s chairmanship in 2008 and has been chairman (together with Claudia Roth) ever since. In the 2013 federal election he will run as a candidate for the German Bundestag as well (see Cem Özdemir, 2013; Stern.de, 2008; Was war wann?, 2012).

Migrants and TCNs in the daily political work

As shown in the report, migrants and TCN are involved in the bigger German political parties. However, as described in chapter 4, hardly any data on this involvement exist. A very few studies deal with the topic of elected representatives with a migration background; a few studies explore election decisions and party preferences of voters with a migration background. Still, there are no official figures on the quantity of migrants or TCN and their involvement in day-to-day political work. The parties do not have a monitoring on both their elected officials and their members with regard to their migration background – although this monitoring is recommended by the Federal Government’s Integration Indicator Report (Beauftragte der Bundesregierung, 2011; see also Wüst, 2011b: 131). However, most parties do have statistics on their members’ backgrounds: When becoming a party member of the CDU, SPD, FDP or the Green Party, people have to state their nationality as well as place of birth. These parties have the numbers of members with a foreign nationality as well as foreign-born members – and, thus, have an indicator on the amount of members with a migration background. Data exists for the SPD: In December 2004, 6,755 SPD-members had a foreign nationali-
ty. This amounts to about 1% of all members. The SPD also stated in 2011, when implementing a quota for its executive committee, that 14% of the party’s members have a migration background (Spiegel Online, 2011a). The numbers emphasise the assumption that a membership in a party becomes more appealing to migrants after naturalisation (Wiedemann, 2006: 278).

The analysis in chapter 4 of this report shows that the number of elected representatives with a migration background has increased. Not even two decades ago, Cem Özdemir was the first Member of Parliament with a Turkish background; today, more and more Turkish immigrants and their descendents are represented in the federal and many state as well as municipal parliaments. This development indicates that more and more migrants and TCNs are actively involved in the parties’ daily routines, since parties ordinarily recruit their elected officials from long-time members. Despite of this increasing number, people with a migration are still under-represented in political parties in Germany (see also chapter 4).

Migrants’ and TCNs’ access to political parties

There is hardly any information on migrant’s actual access to political parties either. A study by the Max-Planck-Institute in cooperation with the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation – a political foundation affiliated with the Green Party – analysed elected officials with a migration background on the municipal level (Schönwälder et al., 2011). It found out that a majority of the interviewed politicians had been active and involved before, e.g. in their country of origin or in Migration/Integration Advisory Councils, local initiatives and trade unions. Such comparatively low-threshold forms of political involvement are regarded as stepping stone for the involvement in political parties. In particular the advisory councils can be seen as a means of the political socialisation of people with a migration background. In some cities there are networks between the councils and the local parties facilitating the access to the political parties (HBS, 2011a).

Youth organisations and foundations affiliated with a party are further ways of accessing a political party for people with a migration background. Moreover, some parties also have affiliated organisations for particular migrant groups. There is, for instance, the Liberal Turkish-German Association (Liberale Türkisch-Deutsche Vereinigung, LTD), which is affiliated with the FDP. The LTD was founded in 1993 to actively involve migrants in politics, establish a platform for exchange between cultures and religious groups, promoting the issues of minorities and supporting liberalism (LTD, 2013). Within the Christian Democratic Union there is a platform concerned with integration policy – the German-Turkish Forum (Deutsch-Türkisches Forum, DTF). Established in 1997 it aims at bringing the issues of people with a Turkish background into the party and familiarise voter with a Turkish background with the CDU’s policy (DTF, 2013). The CDU further established two websites – for people with a Turkish background as well as ethnic German Spätaussiedler (who migrated mainly from Russia/ the former Soviet Union) – to approach these groups and recruit new party members (see: http://www.hosgeldiniz.cdu.de/index.htm, http://www.außiedler.cdu.de/).

Joining process of migrants/TCNs in political parties

Unfortunately, there is no information in research literature available on how people with a migration background actually join a political party. It can be presumed that there is no migrant specific means of joining. In general, people who want to become a member of the party just fill in the application form; the local branch decides then whether or not to accept the applicant. To get to know the party’s work, a guest membership is also possible (see chapter 3).

The bigger parties in Germany usually have specific programmes for the promotion of young/new party members, which are open for all new members and, thus, for people with a migration back-
ground as well (but this group is no specific target group). FDP and the Green party, for instance, have a mentoring programme for (young) women who should be encouraged to take up a political office within the parties. In the course of the mentoring programme they are accompanied by mentors from the federal and state branch of the party and gain insight in the party’s work. The left party also offers a mentoring programme which is open to men as well. In the SPD, members can participate in the party’s training, e.g. on civic education, leadership or municipal policies. The Green Party has a widespread programme for the promotion of young party members: Apart from their mentoring programme, new members can take work placements in the party, participate in a trainee programme and apply for the Green Associates, who work in the federal executive committee of the Greens and implement their own projects there. The Greens also have an action plan for promoting new members that emphasises the importance of recruiting and training young and new members and illustrates the means to achieve these aims (DIE GRÜNEN, 2004).

A study conducted by the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES, 2012) found out that there are, however, entry barriers for people with a migration background to join political parties. Among them are:
- language problems (in particular for 1st generation migrants),
- the lack of the German nationality (since German nationality is required to vote and stand as a candidate),
- social background (migrants have, on average, a lower socio-economic background and are, thus, statistically less likely to join a political party),
- unfamiliarity with the party’s inner structure and its routines
- being reduced to the migration background and to migration- and integration-related issues, though the person does not see him- or herself this way, as well as
- discrimination and a deficiency-oriented view on migrants (emphasising problems rather than potentials of migrants).

Types of migrants’/TCNs’ activities and engagement

Just like the topics and interests of migrant’s political work (see below), their activities and engagement in politics are heterogeneous. They can certainly not be reduced to migration- or integration-related issues: In a study for the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation, Schönwälder et al interviewed about 30 elected officials with a migration background on the local level asking about their motivations and activities. The study showed that only a minority of the interviewed politicians with a migration background regard this background as essential for their engagement: They emphasised that their decision for getting nominated by their party was not motivated by promoting migrants’ needs or inducing changes in their parties’ integration policy. They rather did not want to be reduced to these topics and thought that concentrating too much on the group of migrants could reduce their chances for winning votes from the majority population. Still, quite a few of the interviewed local politicians were also active in migrant organisations. There was, however, a difference between male and female elected officials with a migration background; women were usually even less concerned with migrant-related issues. On the other hand, the (alleged) proximity of these politicians with a migration background to migrant communities was underlined and used in times of electoral campaigning for winning votes in these communities (Schönwälder et al., 2011: 41).

Migrants/TCNs in the nomination processes within political parties

Nomination is in general often linked to good contacts, friends and networks within the party to reach enough supporters. This could get problematic for migrants if they are not long-established in
the party or the area. Again, the study by Schönwälder et al. is one of the few to get an insight in these inner-party activities concerning migrants. According to this study, being a politician with a migration background has its advantages and disadvantages as well.

On the one hand, having a migration background can enhance the chance to get nominated for a political office, since the bigger parties are in a process of intercultural opening up and, thus, want to promote diversity within the party as well as nominate candidates with a migration background (see above). In the study, several interviewees stated that this diversity approach had a positive impact on their nomination (Schönwälder et al., 2011: 50-51). The Social Democrats, for instance, implemented a quota at the national level aiming at raising the share of people with a migration background in the party’s executive committee to 15% and nominated their first person with a migration background for this committee in 2011\textsuperscript{24}; the CDU nominated four members with a migration background for their executive committee in 2012 to present their opening process to the public (taz.de, 2011; Focus.de, 2012).

On the other hand, this opening process is regarded by some migrants as only a symbolic act. They criticise that candidates with a migration background are often not nominated for a promising place on the party’s list for elections and that members with a migration background still face discrimination, prejudices and even racism within their parties. In a local branch, for instance, some SPD members resigned their membership when a person with a Turkish background became vice chairman. This can be seen as a barrier for migrants’ nomination processes in the parties (Schönwälder et al., 2011: 50-51; Süddeutsche.de, 2010b).

Topics of migrants’/TCNs’ political work

Politicians with a migration background work on different topics, covering very different themes of the political work – just like any other politicians (see: Deutscher Bundestag, 2009). Some politicians with a migration background specialise in migration- and integration-related issues. This group is – according to a study from Schönwälder et al (Schönwälder et al., 2011) – outnumbered: The study shows that on the local level, two-thirds of the analysed elected officials do not regard the topic as being important for their political work. However, the study also proves that party members with a migration background are at risk of being reduced to this topic and of being reduced to their background and alleged experience with the issue. A study carried out by the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation (FES, 2012) came to the conclusion that reducing a party member with a migration background to this background and to migration- and integration-related issues constitutes an entry barrier for migrants to join a political party. Elected officials have to learn to deal with this. Cem Özdemir once said in an interview concerning this problem: “Even if I was the person responsible for the topic of sexuality in the Green party, people would still ask me about sexuality of immigrants”.

Migrants’/TCNs’ motivations and objectives to work in political parties

The study conducted by Schönwälder et al for the Heinrich-Böll-Foundation, which was mentioned before, also analysed motivations and objectives of migrants to join political parties – based on about 30 interviews with elected officials on the local level. It emphasised that the wish to influence politics is the dominant motive for migrants to become active in a party. Further motives and objections are enjoying political work and the will to take over responsibility for fellow citizens. For members of the CDU/CSU interviewed for the study, the latter reason was predominant. For this group

\textsuperscript{24} The quota was implemented by the federal executive committee; the state committees are called to implement it as well. The quota is, however, controversial in the party: Some regard it as an obvious reaction after keeping Thilo Sarrazin (who started a debate with his racist remarks in his book “Germany is abolishing itself”) as a member of the SPD in order to prove that the party is open to migrants (Spiegel Online, 2011b).
the influence of friends and family members on the decision is also higher compared to members of other parties. Taken as a whole, specific political objectives are far more often the reason for joining a party than personal benefits. A minority of the interviews elected officials stated that they became a member of the party in order to obtain a political office (Schönwälder et al., 2011: 48). As shown above, migrant-related objectives are not very common. The motivations of migrants emphasised in the study do not differ much from general motivations to join a party in Germany researched in other studies (Klein and Spier, 2011).

Levels of migrants’/ TCNs’ engagement

Migrants and people with a TCN background are involved on all levels of politics in Germany. As shown in chapter 4, they are elected officials in local, regional and national parliaments as well as in the EU parliament. It was also demonstrated that there is hardly any statistical data on migrants’ (and particular TCNs’) engagement in politics. Still, studies indicate that their share is largest at the local level and decreases from there to the regional and national levels. However, people with a migration are under-represented in the German political system.

As shown as well, there is a positive trend, i.e. altogether an increase in the number of politicians with a migration background. Parties have this topic on their agendas and try to raise the numbers and share of migrants – for both their members as well as elected officials. They implemented quotas (SPD) and nominated migrants for their executive committees (e.g. CDU). An investigation for this report analysed the federal committees of the big German parties; results are presented in Table 5. There are big differences between the parties and need for improvement – since the percentages are far lower than the share of people with a migration background in the German population.

Table 5: Party leaders with a migration background

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Total Members</th>
<th>Party Leaders with a Migration Background</th>
<th>Rate among Party Leaders</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Green Party</td>
<td>59,074</td>
<td>2 out of 19</td>
<td>10.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU</td>
<td>489,896</td>
<td>5 out of 60</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPD</td>
<td>489,683</td>
<td>3 out of 36</td>
<td>8.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP</td>
<td>63,123</td>
<td>3 out of 54</td>
<td>5.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Left Party</td>
<td>69,458</td>
<td>2 out of 44</td>
<td>4.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSU</td>
<td>150,585</td>
<td>0 out of 55</td>
<td>0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: own investigation of the CJD, based on numbers published by the parties (CJD Hamburg + Eutin/ Markard, April 2013)
6. Awareness within the parties and prospects

As demonstrated in chapter 5, political parties are getting more and more aware of the topics immigration, integration and diversity within the political system. They realised that these topics are important for the parties’ future and that they need to take action in order to attract people with a migration background – members as well as voters. In general, the bigger parties (except the Greens) are faced with a decreasing number of members: The share of party members among all people eligible to vote has been decreasing ever since the 1980s (4.6% in 1980 compared to 2.3% in 2008) (Schmidt, 2011)

About one-fifth of the German population has a migration background and the numbers are increasing. Germany’s population with a migration background is a very heterogeneous group; still, there are some trends in their preference for political parties. The two biggest migrant groups – ethnic German Spätaussiedler and migrants with a Turkish background – historically have different preferences: Turkish immigrants, who mainly came to Germany as so-called guest workers, have a comparatively strong affiliation with trade unions and predominantly voted for the Social Democrats – and still do, although to a lesser extent. Ethnic German Spätaussiedler (who emigrated from the former Soviet Union to Germany and are seen by the state as German nationals) used to prefer the CDU/CSU; over the past years, however, they more frequently voted for the SPD as well (DW, 2010).

In summary, it can be said that voters with a migration background tend to the centre-left parties (SPD, Left and Green Party). These parties’ statutes, programmes and activities have dealt with migrants’ issues in an open way and have usually been more progressive, i.e. concerning dual citizenship or voting rights for TCNs on the local level, which they promote. FDP and CDU/CSU only recently began their opening process. The person responsible for integration of the Bavarian state government, Martin Neumeyer (CSU), whose party has not actually started to take action yet, stated in an interview that integration is the “mega topic of the future” and that the CSU has to increase its efforts to approach migrants and interest them in the party’s work (MiGAZIN, 2011). The head of the CDU’s German-Turkish Forum, for instance, pointed out that particularly the Turkish community in Germany offers a huge potential for new voters, since many of them have a conservative view on society and agree with the CDU on issues such as family. The CDU is, thus, interested in having Germans with a Turkish background in their party and therewith attract voters. The party presents them as role models, trying to reach out to the Turkish community, which has concerns towards the CDU with regard to the party’s dealing with their issues in the past (and partly present), i.e. opposing dual citizenship and local voting rights for TCNs (Arslan, 2011).

The parties’ engagement in the topic of inner-party diversity is, thus, often influenced by the need to attract voters (DW, 2012) However, this need to become attractive for voters – as well as the perception of a changing society requiring changing institutions that reflect the structure of the population – led the bigger parties in Germany to start an opening process and welcome the active involvement of people with a migration background in the party. Party leaders tend to be more progressive in this regard: They announce quotas, appoint ministers with a migration background and nominate migrants for the executive committees. The experience of party members with a migration background, however, shows that not all migrants feel welcome in the parties: Discrimination and racist comments occur in local branches, e.g. of the SPD and CDU (see above). Activities within the parties to foster diversity can also be initiated by working groups on the topic migration, integration and diversity. The appeal of the Left Party’s working group to give promising places on the party’s list to migrants in the 2013 election can be seen as a good practice in this regard. Furthermore, the parties’ programmes an important basis for dealing with diversity.
The Green Party, for instance, emphasises in its 2009 electoral programme the importance of interesting and involving migrants in politics. The latter issue is something all bigger parties are aware of; its implementation is, however, in progress.

The national report for Germany showed that – although migrants are still under-represented in the German political system – the number of elected officials with a migration background in the big parties has increased over the past decades. This positive trend is supposed to continue in the nearer future (Wüst, 2011a). As described, the bigger parties realised the need to open up for the increasing number of people with a migration background in the country. There is, however, the risk for the intercultural opening process of being a symbolic policy, since migrants still face discrimination in some parties. But the parties have started to promote an open, diversity-oriented and welcoming atmosphere for migrants in their organisations on all levels.
7. Introduction: general information about the interviews und interviewees

The empirical data presented in this document on the issue of the political participation of people with a migration background and third-country nationals in political parties is based on the second working step of the project “Diversity in Political Parties’ Programmes, Organisation and Representation (DIVPOL)”, which is funded by the European Integration Fund. This second working step included planning, conducting and evaluating qualitative interviews with political actors.

The first working step of the project, presented the theoretical basis, more current scientific and public debate, the findings of more recent empirical studies, but also currently existing internal party or political developments regarding the intercultural opening of political parties or efforts within the parties to investigate increasing ethnic diversity within the electorate (cf. The project’s “Desk Research Report”). The aim of this second report is to provide a detailed analysis of qualitative interviews on this topic conducted with 43 political actors.

The 43 people we interviewed come from the following groups: politicians with a migration background (MB) (n=13), politicians without a MB (n=10); party workers and internal party door openers (n=9; of whom 3 have a MB) and representatives of migrant organizations (MO) (n=11). All of the interviewees are politically active full-time employees or volunteers in various local, regional and/or national contexts and levels of work. The politicians, party workers and internal party door openers all belong to the spectrum of the major parties of the German Federal Republic: seventeen interviewees are members of the SPD, six are members of the Green Party, four of the FDP, three of the CDU and two of the Left Party. Four of the interviewees have no political mandate.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>SPD (Social Democratic Party)</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Party</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FDP (Free Democratic Party)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CDU (Christian Democratic Union)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Left Party</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Representatives of migrant organizations</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus group participants</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Individual interviews</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The migrant organizations taking part in the interviews are active both regionally and nationally as umbrella organizations throughout Germany. As a matter of course the various MO represent the interests of people of Turkish origin, black people or Pakistanis in Germany, or they strive in general for the intercultural co-existence of people with a MB and Germans.

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25 One exception here is the CSU. This party was not included in the project, as it only exists in Bavaria.
26 The exact distribution of the political actors we interviewed according to gender, party affiliation, mandate possession and political level is as follows:

Politicians with a MB: 13
Level: National level: 3, Federal State level: 4, Local Authority level: 4; no mandate: 2
Gender: female: 2; male: 11
Between May and September 2013 approximately 75 individuals (mainly functionaries or mandate holders of their parties) and 14 migrant organizations were asked to participate in an interview. The project was presented to the German Institute for Human Rights and the specialist working groups of the Green Party and the SPD in Berlin and Hamburg. In addition, the project’s main interest and working steps were presented to the interior minister of Schleswig-Holstein (SPD) and in the head office of the CDU. 33 individual interviews and two group interviews were conducted with a total of 10 participants. In all we were able to evaluate 43 individual statements from political actors with and without a MB, of whom 11 are representatives of an MO. All those invited to take part in interviews were firstly informed in writing about the project and the interview objectives in order then to arrange a time for the interview. Of the private individuals invited to take part, 34 agreed, 12 declined and 17 did not reply. In addition, 12 of the politicians we contacted did not reply, who should have been sent by the CDU head office. Of the 14 MO we invited, nine responded and five did not. All three MO we invited took part in the focus groups, as did three more who were not directly invited to participate by the interviewer ("snowball system").

We aimed to create a balanced representation of the parties, the political levels, the political actors with a MB, as well as the MO representatives in proportion to the distribution of the interviewees.

Unfortunately, we were not able to reflect seats in the Bundestag at all proportionately, even in the distribution of the interviewees over the parties. This was mainly due to the difficulty of finding interviewees from the CDU. It was clear that the promise given by the CDU party headquarters prior to the empirical phase to allow us access to their politicians and invite them to participate in interviews was not fulfilled. The three CDU politicians we did interview from the sample were contacted directly by the interviewer. In the light of this, the findings – independent of the qualitative methodology of the investigation – cannot be understood to be representative of a distribution of the party spectrum in relationship to the majority situation.

The main point of interest of the interview focused on the following: in order to understand the starting point and path taken for each individual political career, the interviewees were asked about the motivation for their engagement in a political party in order then to determine the individual path taken to joining a party. They were also asked about the welcoming culture they had experienced and their acceptance into the party. They were then asked about the principal issues politicians with and without a MB dealt with in their respective parties and careers, not only to investigate the connection between the (non-) existence of a migration background and dealing with issues of migration and/or integration, but also to understand the extent to which the issue of political partici-

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Party: CDU: 1; SPD: 7; Green Party: 3; FDP: 1; Left Party: 1
Politicians without a MB: 10
Level: National: 2; Federal State: 6; no mandate: 2
Gender: female: 4; male: 6
Party: CDU: 2; SPD: 5; Green Party: 2; FDP: 1; Left Party: -
Party members with third-country nationality: -
Party workers and internal party door openers (Public Relations/Campaigning & member recruitment / support, Party Development, Strategy, Party Schools): 9(of whom three with a MB)
Level: National: 9
Gender: female: 1; male: 8
Party: CDU: -; SPD: 5; Green Party: 1; FDP: 2; Left Party: 1
Representatives of Migrant Organizations: 10 (via Focus group) + 1 (individual interview)
Gender: female: 7; male: 4;
Organization: TGH / TGD (Turkish Community): 5; IMIC (Intercultural Migrant Integration Centre): 1; iaf (Association of binational Families and Partnerships): 1; Members of the Pakistani Community: 1; ISD (Initiative of Black People in Germany): 2; EachOneTeachOne (EOTO): 1
pation and representation “has arrived” at all within the parties and among their actors. In addition, they were asked about the process of intercultural opening in the parties.

The main focus in the next step was the party structures, together with the question of issue-specific, but also individual networks, the nomination processes and (typical) career paths of the individual political actors. In addition, we highlighted the functions of the political actors with a MB as office holders; on the one hand regarding their particular use for (election) success of the parties, on the other in respect of the process of intercultural opening, support of diversity processes and anti-racism work within the respective party. Finally, the questions focused on the extent to which TCN are represented in political parties and their level of participation in the forming of party policy.

The transcribed interview material was sorted and clustered using the MAXQDA program. The subsequent analysis of the interviews was carried out in accordance with qualitative-heuristic factors. When presenting the essential findings, we have tried as much as possible to support these with quotations from the interviewees, in order to make the analysis transparent and at the same time to make the intersubjective verification of the analysis possible.

All of the findings and descriptions presented in this document refer exclusively to the statements of the 43 interviewees and are not representative. All of the politicians and party workers are German nationals. Ten people are former third-country nationals. At least four of them did not have German citizenship at the time they became party members.

8. Access to and becoming a member of the party

8.1. Political socialisation and individual motivation for political engagement in a party

Politicization and political socialisation

Half of the politicians we interviewed who did not have a migration background emphasized that they had become politically socialized at home and later to some extent through a youth organization (of a party). This socialization is regarded by the interviewees as a matter of course or as “natural” or “classical” and led “automatically” to their joining a party while they were still very young (E8, E13, E22, E23, E24, E26). On the other hand, only two of the thirteen interviewees with a MB were already members of a party-affiliated youth organization (E11, E20).

Only a few stated that they had been politicised at school (E20 with a MB and of the 2nd generation, E23, E26), at university (E7, E2 = among those with a MB and of the 2nd generation) or at an educational establishment (E25).

Contrary to the people with no migration history, most politicians with a MB had been politicised in their country of origin by major political upheavals such as the resistance to the fascists in Turkey, the Prague Spring, the Iranian Revolution, by the suppression of an ethnic group or struggle for its recognition, or a democratic movement in their homeland (E1, E3, E7, E11, E12, E19, E29, E30). Only one person (of the 2nd generation) mentioned the discrimination and stigmatisation they had experienced in Germany as an additional aspect of their politicization (E7).
Motivation for party-political engagement

While most politicians without a MB were members of a party, in order to put their party affiliation on record and to take on responsibility (E22, E23, E24, E25, E26), the majority of interviewees with a MB (E1, E3, E6, E7, E9, E10) as well as politicians without a MB from predominantly smaller parties wanted to broaden their opportunities for participation and have a greater political voice (E13, E14, E15) or “organize governmental action” (E5).

Those who wanted to have more influence joined a party, in order to give their often previous political engagement (in civil society circles) greater sway (E10, E12), “to bring important issues to the fore” (E14), “to get something actually moving” (E15, E9, E1) or “to influence the bigger picture” and to gain the power “to change things” (E7). What our interviewees wanted to create included equal rights in education and equal opportunities, to improve employees’ rights, to fight for human rights and/or overall to “cancel out” social inequality. They were able to identify with their party on the grounds, for example, of their own educational career via the route of second-chance education as a classical Gastarbeiter’s child or on the grounds of values such as freedom and democracy. For many of the Green Party politicians the grass-roots democracy and democratic politics of the party were decisive.

Two of those who were Third-country nationals when they joined the party spoke of their wish to have a part in debate and express their own opinion, and therefore at least to participate indirectly in spite of them having no access to passive and active voting rights (E3, E6): “I was a member with no voting rights at all. Nevertheless it was important to me to be able to take part in debate, at least express myself, voice my opinions within the smaller structures, that is to say at the local association level” (E6).

8.2. Pathways to becoming a party member

Many of the interviewees gained access to their political party through personal contacts. One interviewee was asked by his mentor (a successful politician without MB)27 if he would like to work as an independent person in a working group dealing with right-wing extremism; he did so, got to know the party better, and decided to join. Some politicians with a MB reported being approached by party functionaries and therefore joined the party (E2, E19, E20). Two politicians with a MB stated that they had had successful politicians with a MB as their role model or mentor (E9, E12).

Some of the interviewees also became involved in parties through contacts with politics and the administration at work or through membership of a union. Going to a party event was named as another way of gaining access to a party.

Unlike most of the interviewees with a migration biography, many politicians without a MB became party members when as young as 13 – 16. For them, becoming a party member was no great hurdle. One of them had taken part in a youth parliament at the local authority level and as a result had “very quickly learned ... that political engagement paid off. I mean, I had the feeling that my engagement made things happen, together with others, not alone of course. And I believe this kept me go-

27 MB indicates migration background, MO indicates migrant organization and ICO indicates intercultural opening.
ing and then I started to do more and more until the point came when I was so intensively involved that I became what I am now – a full-time politician” (E13)

8.3. Issues of politicians with a migration background

The majority of the politicians with migration background we interviewed described areas of work in which the topic of integration / migration plays an important role. For example, they work on participation, equal opportunities in education, work and social matters, employee rights and rights of co-determination in companies, urban development, housing policy and neighbourhood management (“Quartiersmanagement”), but also especially on racism and right-wing extremism as well as on human rights policy, immigration and asylum policies. Some interviewees deal additionally or exclusively with areas (economy, environmental protection, protection of nature, international policy, security policy) in which integration / migration plays not an important role in the dominant discourse.

Most of the politicians we interviewed who have a migration background regard integration policy as a mainstream issue and are critical of the many people who take a reductionist view of it, and politicians with a MB are often forced to deal with this issue. Overall, it can be said that most of the interviewees with a MB are involved with a wide range of matters, even if they are often reduced to the issue of integration by the media or the party / colleagues.

“... we are always having to repeat that integration is a mainstream issue that touches on all areas of politics. And people are always trying to reduce it, but it’s a part of every area of politics, don’t you think?” (E6)

“I don’t mean these areas in the narrow sense, but the function of integration policy – that is a mainstream issue. That’s where it’s all about education, the labour market, participation, many areas. Perhaps I should have gone into the area of trade or small business, because I don’t believe that someone with a migration background should automatically go into migration policy. We have to cross over into normality, where competences are decisive, not background.” (E4)

Many had already dealt with the issue before becoming members of the party, some not until afterwards, as the party was poorly geared in this direction. Some of the politicians regretted that they were not able to get involved in other issues they were interested in (such as the economy or education).

It was also pointed out that integration plays a role in many political fields and not just for people with a history of immigration: “And the issue of migration / integration plays a role in these areas, but not exclusively for this target group, people with a migration background, but for all target groups.” (E10)

One interviewee criticized, however, the fact that colleagues continually warned him “not to let himself be stereotyped and pinned to this issue” (E7), but he himself believes that those politicians who deal with integration should not be ashamed of their field of work and that it is good if you can work with this issue authentically, which is regarded in other areas of politics as normal (gender, queer).

“...and have always portrayed it as some kind of problem when I say I’m an integration politician. Wrong, don’t you think? Because I also oppose clientization, you know? So. I think, when I have a problem, then I’d like to be able to deal with it myself, and deal with it authentically, you know what I mean?” (E7)

Nevertheless, integration appears to be regarded by colleagues and party officials as an issue with which you “cannot win any major prizes” (E10).
8.4. Party “Welcoming Cultures”

What exactly is a welcoming culture?

“Exactly, the decisive factor for me was the Members Meeting. I had the feeling there of being normal, that I had come as a completely normal person.” (E12)

A welcoming culture means approaching people, making them concrete offers and inviting them in:

“My favourite expression is: I can say to you, ‘come to me at seven, we’ll eat every evening at seven o’clock.’ OK, it’s an invitation, it’s friendly, but when I say: ‘Please come on the 14th of August at seven, we’ll eat pasta and tomato sauce’ or ‘pork knuckle with sauerkraut’ (laughs)... that is a concrete invitation. I know what to expect. And this has probably not sunk in with the parties, yet.” (E10)

A welcoming culture also means preparing a space for new arrivals and recognizing their potential, taking it seriously and greeting it as useful (culture of recognition):

“They have to change the conditions within the parties, I mean the welcoming culture in the party ... You can’t say come over sometime ..., if there aren’t enough places in the living room, or if the places are arranged in such a way that the one who has just arrived can’t sit down ... then they say: you are welcome here, we want your potential, we need you, sometime.” (E10)

A welcoming culture means improving the structures for participation and motivating people to become actively involved in the party:

“You have to live participation! Within the party, within society, don’t you? And invite people into the structures, bring them in. Only then have you created a welcoming culture.” (E6)

What stands in the way of a Welcoming Culture?

One interviewee with a MB said that the parties had their own way of “being organized” (20), which seemed very confusing and “strange” to new arrivals. She believed that parties would be well advised to provide mentors for new members to help them find their bearings. This would not only facilitate access to the party and the transition from youth organization and local association of the party, but also prevent new members from ending their engagement again very soon after joining the party. Other interviewees have experienced their party not only as alien but as a place where political content is not the main objective, but gaining positions of power, where personalities, “cliques”, networks, and internal power structures are more important:

“Yeah, but I think it’s a big problem, because it’s never about content, never about ability, it’s only ever about who has gained some position of power or other and how they did it. And there are many ways in which you can do that. Starting from some personal relationship right up to buying your way in, that’s the way I see it; you promise another person something, and you get something in return for the favour, etc. All the insider dealing that everyone knows about. But it seems to be the norm.” (E7)

These internal power structures and the general atmosphere of competition that predominates the whole political field but also the organizational culture of parties would be rejected by many new members, unless they had already been socialized through their participation in a party’s youth organization: “Because at JUSOS you learn how to wheel and deal and all that crap.” (E7)

Some also suspected the existence of regional differences, as the organization’s culture is also very variable in terms of people and as a consequence the welcoming culture depends on whether “you have a nice open local association chairman or an alpha male” (E19).
“When I was in North-Rhine Westphalia... The Landtagsfraktion (state parliament group) said to me that the Berlin Association had the reputation for being full of ‘sharks’. So Berlin seems to be even worse. But I only know how it is in Berlin, in that respect.” (E7)

Experiences to the contrary were also reported to us in our sample, which could be an indicator for regional differences. For example, one interviewee without a MB said that she had been very positively received (E5):

“A group can give you the feeling: you’re new, we’re not interested in anything you say. Or you arrive and they say, ‘Wow, that’s really interesting’, and ‘go on, tell us why you want to join us, and what experiences have you had so far?’ A really nice reception... I settled in to my local association straight away and have been very well received.” (E5, politician without MB)

Another interviewee, also without a MB, said that it helped her with the transition from the youth organization in the local association, and that the chair of the association there ensured that “younger people had their say, are given a chance, especially young women” (E22). One interviewee with a MB reported that he meets up with party colleagues in his leisure time, and doesn’t just mix with them at party sessions. He experienced the party as one “big family” (E10). Another with a MB reported being received as a person with individual competences and strengths:

However, many interviewees with a MB regretted that parties have not yet developed a proper welcoming culture. Some interviewees had to endure the experience of not being welcomed personally:

Interviewer: “Yes, and what happened when you became a member?” Interviewee: “Nothing whatsoever!”

Interviewer: Okay. ... Weren’t you shown everything that you would be able to do, put in motion so to speak, where you could get involved?” Interviewee: “Nothing! Nothing at all! ... I remember being at a JUSOS event in 2007 and no-one came over to greet me, welcome me, shake my hand or ask me who I was, there was absolutely nothing, I mean, they looked at me as if I was some kind of extra-terrestrial. It really was quite odd.” (E7)

“... and at this [local association] meeting I was just ignored and no-one asked me who I was, until afterwards, when it was all over, an hour and a half later they said: What was it you wanted, exactly? That sort of thing. Then I said: I want to become a member. And then they just gave me a form and said: Yes, you can become a member on this. (E12)

Criticism was aimed at the parties for having integration etc. on the agenda, but not doing anything about it from their own ranks, because no-one was prepared to disturb the existing power structures:

“What happens is that, together, the parties do indeed try to keep the issue on their agenda, right? But their own people don’t manage to create these welcoming cultures in order also to clarify matters of power distribution or to make participation possible.” (E6)

All told, it was the members of larger parties who told of negative experiences or of a general lack of a welcoming culture in their party / parties. In smaller and usually younger parties it seems to be easier to establish a welcoming culture. The most positive experiences were reported about them. However, members of larger parties also pointed out that their party was either developing or improving their welcoming culture.
What furthers a Welcoming Culture?

- Party information material available in many languages and an overall “more colourful” approach (E4, E8, E22)
- A welcoming culture can also be furthered by actively going into migrant associations and canvassing:
  
  “How was the chairman? Welcoming? Did he take you seriously? Did he by any chance encourage anyone to say: ‘Hey, come on! You can join us on the committee, be an observer or a clerk.’ You know, do some active recruitment for the association. This is not the case in many associations. And now some are complaining that there are parallel structures. And they do exist, don’t they, how can I put it, in all groups, regardless of origin, where people don’t have these values. It’s always the same thing: will I be able to participate? Will I gain people’s trust? In society?” (E6)

- Actively searching for, contacting, inviting (to events) and supporting people with a MB (e.g. friends from civil society contexts) who could be inspired to work for the party and who have the potential do so

- Trial membership and other types of low-threshold offers

- Involvement of people via issue-related activities of the working groups:
  
  “... that’s our way of saying that we’re making an effort to involve people who are not XXX-members and in the long term we might even convince them of this. It’s not the priority aim, but once they’re in they might be won over and think: ‘Hey, X is in, Y is in, Thomas is there, Kathrin is there, Sabine is there, wow, that really is pretty good.’” (E10)

- Promote intercultural sensitivity by distributing intercultural calendars / co-ordinating party events with holidays of various religions (E27)

- Special support and guidance for new members at every organizational level: “specific, targeted programmes for new members / extra events to which the new members are invited.” Something which in some cases has been “completely out of the field of vision” in the past” (E23). As a reaction to their own negative experiences, some interviewees have been developing a welcoming structure in their local association. There they receive new members themselves and, for example, nominate a representative who is competent in this area:
  
  “Well now, my department is a good one, I must say, it takes care of things, which in itself is a competence, isn’t it? And we shouldn’t forget that. So when people say there’s no welcoming culture here, it’s always such a sweeping condemnation, which just doesn’t make sense, because what exactly is a welcoming structure, then? Offering someone a biscuit, a cup of tea or coffee, or sitting down and getting to know them? That’s got a lot to do with ability, the ability to deal with people, social competence, hasn’t it? Not everyone has this and it needs to be developed and as far as I’m concerned people can learn that at workshops or something. Either that or you look for someone in the department where they say: “hey, he’s a sociable type and we put him in charge. And that’s the sort of thing that we’ve done, too, in XXX, in every department.” (E7)

- Special icebreaker meetings for new members with the committee so that they can get to know each other, with an introduction to the activities of the district association and the opportunities for involvement, and an introduction to the work of the party. (E.g. How to set up a working group. How do the structures of a party function?)
  
  “Yes, to speak personally to people who come to us. That starts quite simply with a round of introductions. Everyone attending introduces themselves, and then the new person. And we have of course discussed the issues that are of interest for those who are normally there and also for any newcomers. Any ideas the newcomer has about working in politics ... are quickly brought into the dialogue. And just
to say what we actually do to listen to what the newcomers find interesting as well”. (E14)

- Offers of informal mentoring or mentoring programmes
- Possibilities for participation for third-country nationals: “The very fact that you as a party member without voting rights could participate in internal party elections makes this welcoming structure very positive.” (E3)
- A welcoming culture could also mean that new members are asked immediately after joining if they want to take up a position of responsibility or a candidature: Several interviewees (with and without a MB) had already been asked after a short time, some immediately, if they wanted to up an internal party function on the committee (also possible for TCN) and then introduced to the work of the office. (E3, E6, E20, E21, E14, E15)
  “One thing that particularly appealed to me was the fact that it was possible to do something right away. That you weren’t just one of many, but that it meant straight away that you were asked to work on the committee. We’re working on this or that and do you want to take part. And as a young person in particular, it’s important, you don’t just want to be a name on file card, you want to feel you’re taken seriously, you want to do something” (E15, E14, E1)

- Networks and Initiatives:
  - WGs, which work on ICO, such as the SPD’s Migration and Diversity WG, and the Migrants and Refugees WG of the Green Party
  - Regular meeting groups for new residents who want to express their political views, but who have no voting rights (primarily third-country nationals)
  - “SPD ve biz” (SPD and Us): a project on the local association or district association level run predominantly by people of Turkish descent but also by other interested people from all over Baden-Württemberg with the self-defined aspiration of “offering people with a Turkish MB a political home” and “allying people with a MB to the SPD.” (Source: http://spd-vebiz.de/)
  - "Yesiliz" (We are Green: an initiative of Green Party members from a large nimmer of countries of origin, cultures and religions which “develops ideas for increasing the political participation of migrants, in order to appeal more greatly to people with a migration background and enthuse them for Green policies.” (Source: http://gesche-hand.gruene-braunschweig.de)

8.5. Networks between parties and migrant organizations

We were not able to find a connection between any network linked to a migrant organization and entry to a party. An exception was outlined by an interviewee who, through his work at an association, came into contact with a prominent politician (Cem Özdemir) who encouraged him to join the party. Another interviewee was asked by party officials to take responsibility at local level because of his association work in migrant organization.

However, some interviewees move in circles in civil society (migrant associations or other contexts) with the specific aim of encouraging people to get involved in party politics.
9. Party structures – nomination, career paths and experiences

9.1. Nomination procedures in parties and political career paths

In all parties, only German citizens are eligible for mandates (local, town/city, regional, national) and to vote on these mandates as delegates (Exception: Green Party, see chapter 5). Internal party positions (e.g. secretary) can also be filled by non-Germans (2 cases in the sample).

How do nomination procedures work? There are basically two different types - grassroots democratic procedures and ones where a list is drawn up by the party executive.

**Green Party:**

A grassroots democratic procedure: individual members can apply for places on the list and are elected directly by all members. All members can vote on the list at the general assembly, even those with third-country nationality (see chapter 5). The election is subsequently validated by delegates to ensure it is legally valid.

Many interviewees reported having being asked to take part, i.e. they did not do so on their own initiative. The only stipulation is a quota for women – only women may apply for every odd-numbered place on the list.

“All that follows is more...a matter of the political acumen of the people involved on the spot. In the Green Party there’s always a kind of unspoken quota – if there are 10 places on the list up for grabs, it makes sense of course to have someone from the transgender area, someone with a migration background ... or as an indication ... that we are thinking about that segment of society, an old face, a very young face.” (E3)

When drawing up the list, those in charge of the election point out that “we want to vote on a list which represents all sections of society.” (E3)

**SPD/CDU:**

Compilation of a list of candidates is a top-down procedure: the respective committee (e.g. Land/region) asks the level immediately beneath them (e.g. district association) to suggest candidates and draws up a list according to this, which is then voted on by the conference of delegates. The candidates can be nominated and elected by their local or district associations or alternatively be asked by the executive directly and then placed on the list. Individual members can compete against the candidates on the list in a “candidacy contest”.

**What influences the nomination?**

**SPD:**

When a list is being compiled ranking factors are involved, e.g. regional proportional representation / regional distribution of the local associations, proportional representation of gender / a soft quota, and current trends and needs play a role in the party, such as migration background which is at present an important instrumental criterion. The respective party executive takes an appropriate strategic approach when allocating the places:

“In our party, if the first one on the list is a man, the second must be a woman, and this pattern has to be followed to the end of the list. And that plays a part and after that, I presume, I’m not familiar with the ranking
system, but migration background is a new criterion. And, well, it’s down to a combination of many criteria.” (E10)

The “regional balance of power” between the district associations also plays a role. The executive takes into account a regional distribution of the list of candidates and, for example, large or important associations. At regional conferences various district associations compete with each other. This can lead to people with a MB having fewer chances of being elected onto a place on the list, as district associations with few people with a MB tend to be less open to this (E6). “Migrants” often lag way behind in the listing process: “It has been my experience over many years that migrants are voted out” (???) (i.e. that they don’t receive enough votes to secure a place on the list). The interviewee said that “the hurdles within the party are almost higher than those of the voter outside”. (E6)

It’s more difficult for those who do not belong to the “old boys club” (E7). The support of your own local base is often insufficient. Secretive party wheeling and dealing and the balance of power among the various associations can prevent people with a MB from gaining a promising place on the list. “Alpha males” in the parties, often long-established ones, defend their positions of power. If you come from outside, it’s tough.

The executive committee of the Land can also be “authoritarian” and ignore the district associations when proposing people for certain places on the list of candidates (E1). However, these must then be authorized by the delegates in exactly the same way as the other candidates for the list.

Although the composition of the lists and places on them must be regulated democratically in all areas for individual sub-associations, overall the procedure among the parties we investigated is unclear, not very transparent and difficult for outsiders to understand. The respective committee acts in accordance with specific relevance criteria, weightings and power considerations regarding the various regions, networks and characteristics of the candidates that are barely communicated to the outside world, if at all. The terminology used for various levels in the associations and for positions varies greatly between the Länder, and this makes comparison more difficult. One interviewee, who has been politically active at the federal state level for many years, himself confused the terminology he used in an interview as well as the order of events of various election procedures he went on to describe. Another interviewee described the places on the list thus:

“They’re, I don’t want to say thrown together, by the parliamentary group executive or the party executive … but if someone has been there for a long time, someone has already stood for a place, that will of course be taken into consideration once again.” (E9)

What factors have an individual bearing on nomination?

Most interviewees from all parties were “questioned”. The questioners were sometimes representatives of the respective committees, and others were party colleagues. The reasons given by the interviewees for why they were questioned were, among others, because they had participated very actively; because “their issues” were appropriate to the current needs of the party; because their identity markers were appropriate to current needs (e.g. another woman / a young person / a person with a MB fitted into the team of candidates).

One thing that was always important in all parties if someone wanted to be nominated and elected by delegates / members was how well known the person was: at the base, in the region (through professional commitment, working for organizations such as clubs, associations, unions, foreign nationals’ advisory council, voluntary work and project work); and in the party (internal party networks, to organize a majority for themselves). There are a few cases where it is possible for can-
candidates to be elected on the basis of their election campaign, but there is little future in such an election:

“someone who gives a brilliant speech can in certain circumstances be nominated spontaneously. A person without a network, however, can later often struggle to be integrated into the work of the party, as it is difficult to organize alliances.” (E3)

Support from already well-known politicians is just as helpful: “We have always operated as a team, which has been a great help to me, because he was very well known as a federal state parliamentary representative.” (E5, politician without MB)

Networks outside of the party can facilitate nomination if they support the specialist competence and raise the profile of the applicant (e.g. with charitable organizations, companies, administrations / politics). According to some politicians, engagement in the region, in organizations such as clubs and in voluntary work has helped them greatly to gain a nomination later on. (E6: “If you want to have success in politics, you have to be involved in organizations”)

In all parties it is important to be seen to have competence in certain issues – what issues is the candidate well informed about in the eyes of their party colleagues / executive committee? How important are these for the party? (E10: “with migration you can’t win any big prizes”). Perceived competence in an issue (more than the actual competence) is important, as is the relevance of the issue to the party internally.

A few individuals (SPD) reported that they had to push hard so that they did not just have to deal with the issue of integration: “I do not only stand for the issue of integration” (E10, E6)

Some interviewees pointed out that they had to prove their competence, possibly more than their colleagues without a migration background (E4, E6):

“It’s a competitive business. Even if you have a MB, you don’t automatically have this bonus. I do have it, I admit – e.g. Olaf Scholz has always tried to bring people with a MB into politics, there are such cases – but by and large it’s all about people with a MB having to assert themselves. There’s a certain kind of competition, possibly prejudices, too, concerning people with a MB. I too have the feeling that you’ve always got to assert yourself, prove that you’ve got abilities, and possibly more than those without a MB, in order to find your place and fight for it - that takes a lot of energy.” (E4)

Experience in party politics in our sample has in actual fact been a lesser criterion, which has helped the interviewees be nominated for posts. Only one interviewee had been asked come forward on account of his being involved in party work for many years. In our sample a lack of experience of party work did not stand in the way of nomination and, vice versa, the classic “hard slog” was not the career path taken by the politicians in our sample, with or without a MB.

Standing for election in politics is a competitive business. In many cases a migration background can be a bonus (E4). Similarly, gender can be a bonus, as can age (E5). These “special statuses” can be a reason why an inexperienced candidate might receive more initial support, because this person will be addressing a special target group among the electorate (see above: “strategic list compilation”).

Some politicians reported that they received more support during their first candidature, were asked if they would like to stand, or were even placed by the executive committee. They experienced solidarity, while the business of competition increased during the second nomination. Some (focus group participants with experience in politics) believe that migrant politicians are recruited especially for a legislative body for their “symbolic” value, but then disappear again at the next election due to a lack of firm support:
“It’s true, they support you at the beginning, but then you’re on your own - which... in the end... is fair enough. Even if the party, like ours, is just so incredibly inert where the participation of women is concerned and all those alpha males don’t want leave etc. ... That’s the way it is. You shouldn’t take things too personally anyway - that just makes it harder. [laughs]” (E8, politician without MB)

9.2. Role played by migration background (MB) in the nomination procedure (advantages and disadvantages)

- MB can be an advantage when committees decide that more people with MB should be nominated for the sake of credibility among (potential) voters (E4). In individual cases, it can be that this current “trend” either causes new members to regard their MB as career enhancing or that this actually is the case (E3).

- MB can become a hindrance if it is understood as a superficial factor of nomination: for example, if a person with MB is already on a list and the delegates / members without MB believe that a particular clientele appears to have been attended to. It can then be more difficult for a fellow applicant to be elected to a good place on the list. (see focus group “But you’ve already got someone”)

- Negative: Discrimination by other party members / internal party competition: One person with MB was elected “because the Turks, they just vote for Turks” (E2). Politicians with MB are perceived as competition that serves a different electorate from one’s own. Success at an election is begrudged. The fear of “foreign domination” of the party by voters with MB who would primarily vote for candidates with MB. Similarly, when the competition starts, MB can become grounds for discrimination: a target for the competition in an attempt to force out an opponent within the party.

- Negative: the voters themselves are not able to accept a candidate with a MB, especially in the conservative parties (“I was asked at the campaign stand, what have you done for Germany? ... If he’s a Muslim, then I’m not going to vote for him.”) – This discrimination can of course discourage a candidate, even if the interviewee in this case – according to him – took this more as an incentive ...

9.3. Networks – politicians with the outside world

SPD/Green Party

Contacts with migrant organizations are recognized by the parties as important and are nurtured with varying degrees of intensity. Some politicians with MB complain that contacts are often handed over to politicians with MB (see E1, E2, E4, E5):

„And that’s another point, when I was elected as city councillor here in Stuttgart, our parliamentary group discussed “appointments” at our first meeting. Who goes where? And then, when the migrant associations received inquiries or invitations, they said: ‘Yes, you can go there.’ To which I said: ‘No! I’m going to the fire service, to the Red Cross, to the man on the street – I can make a contribution there. And you have to go to the other associations - that’s an exchange!’"” (E6)

For a party to have real and credible interest in civil society organizations it is important that interest is not only shown before elections (E3, E6) reported that this is also possible in the Green Party) and that sustainable, valued contacts have to be established.
Good practice “signals of recognition”:

Some interviewees at the local level stressed that it was important to value small organizations for their work: “Although [our] elected representatives or local politicians in the area know that you can’t win any big prizes with these organizations. That’s simple ... they can’t vote. But politics also lives from punctuation. And that is one such punctuation mark. If we want to live in a society which is not falling apart, but wants to stick together, it is important to go there, to point out that these organizations also exist in our society, that this work is being done.” (E3)

9.4. Internal party networks, measures and programmes for supporting politicians with MB

In the meantime, all parties have “integration”, “migration”, or “diversity” working groups or networks. These networks are both thematic working groups and bodies of politicians mostly with MB which can also have a career-enhancing effect. Whether intentionally or not, “this networking is very important in politics” (E2), and it makes it possible to some extent for young and new politicians to forge contacts in other regions or at the national level. However, these networks and working groups primarily treat the issue of migration / integration with their political expertise and therefore potentially reinforce the connection between “migration background” and political expertise in the area of integration. (Note: the WG in the Green Party is geared towards political expertise and has been re-established in individual federal states - especially Berlin – following internal disagreements between various groups within the federal state working groups that were too strongly identity-based and is composed of people interested in the issue, including the biodeutsch [autochthonous Germans].)

The SPD’s migration and diversity national working group and the CDU’s integration network have been radically reformed in the last few years. The aim is for the national working groups to be constituted and based upon state working groups in every federal state; some of these are currently still being formed (for example, the CDU in Hessen and Bavaria have still not sent a representative to a national network meeting). Internal party opening is less of an issue for the WGs. It is sometimes unclear which tasks and contents these WGs should be working on; some aspects are still at the discovery stage and over the next few years the groups will be further shaped by the direction taken by the federal state working groups. For example, one working group is still regarded as a “first point of contact” for new members or interested persons with MB, where they can feel at ease and feel welcome, which is not actually the point of a WG with political expertise. (see E5)

However, it is perfectly feasible to regard the existence of the WGs as examples of good practice, especially where the members also act as lobbyists in order to bring “diversity” closer to the heart of the party as a mainstream issue to be taken seriously.

“There are diversity and migration working groups that endeavour to make these issues integral to the party. That in itself is a good development. But migration is a mainstream issue – it can’t just be one of the working group’s tasks, but must become an integral element of the party apparatus. Every measure towards this aim must be examined for its intercultural aspects. We can’t just say: ‘OK, the working group has to deal with that.’ [...] So this mainstreaming really has to function better as part of the party’s work. It depends a lot too on the intercultural skills of those with political responsibility and in addition to the mixed pallet of human resources, how can we further develop intercultural communication.” (E4)
Other good practice

- The SPD’s *Inländerstammtisch* or regular meeting group for residents (since 2002 and now exists in several cities) is there for those who want to get involved in politics, but have no voting rights (third-country nationals). Although the group in Stuttgart does not deal specifically “just with migration” but also with “the economy, care, and the money market as a whole”, it is different in Hamburg-Bergedorf (since 2007) which aims to “offer a forum for discussing integration policy issues objectively without any party politics being involved” ([www.inlaenderstammtisch.de](http://www.inlaenderstammtisch.de)).

- “SPD ve biz” – SPD and Us. A project at the local association and district association level predominantly run by people of Turkish descent specifically for them. They make information available about the party’s work via flyers and posters and at events, in order to get people interested in politics and motivate them to vote in elections. (see Welcoming Culture). Politicians / candidates etc. with MB then become bridge builders at these events: Especially during campaigns you go into mosques, small associations and other organizations “describe what the party’s policies actually are, what they themselves could do, how they could get involved, because out of every hundred people, there are one or two who are also interested – or rather there are more who are interested – but who are also capable [...] Many then say, it’s enough for me to stick up some posters or organize an event, but few have the courage to stand up there from the outset and give a talk. It’s fantastic if you can find someone at an event who themselves want be politically involved and encourage them to do so”. (E2)

It is important that these networks receive non-material, financial and organizational support from the respective party executive committees (e.g. encouragement to work in a working group; a free stand at a party convention; suggestions for projects, etc.). The interviewees also complained of party colleagues referring to “crappy Turkish banners” during arguments within the party.

Internal and non-party networks in which politicians come together due either to professional aspects or particular identity markers (MB, but also youth, women, homosexuality etc.) can be very helpful to individuals not only in their political career through the contacts they make, but also as regards the support received if they experience insecurity or discrimination on the grounds of these identity markers.

Many interviewees described understanding the internal party structures as a hurdle which they had to overcome in their political career. Among these are parliamentary procedures, terminology relating to party instruments, and party structures. Network contacts and mentors – official and unofficial – can help with overcoming these hurdles.

Mentoring programmes – internal or at a higher level – were also often cited as measures for integrating new members with or without MB into the party. Mentors and work experience were also suggested as measures for bringing party politics to young people in general. (“Many have no idea of what the member of parliament looks like, or about parliamentary procedures.” (???)

Quotas for people with MB in political posts: this was mentioned many times in connection with the quota for women. (This is at least regarded as a soft quota in several parties). Some interviewees made a case for soft quotas or “target numbers” for people with MB, which should be in line with the proportion of them in the local population. Most of them said it was necessary to implement “systematic” measures to advance people with MB in politics. This was often justified with reference to the established structures and compared with measures for the advancement of women (except in the FDP?). The Green Party have a fixed quota for women, whereby every other place on the list is reserved for women. In addition, specific places on the list are set aside for “new faces”. The SPD has
a retroactive quota system according to which 40% of the candidates should be women. It is unclear as to how this is implemented.

9.5. **Party structures**

Some party structures mentioned in the interviews were perceived as positive, and some as negative, for the integration of new members in general, and for members with MB in particular:

- “Dusty”, “outdated”, “as with society, not free from discrimination” (E5): according to some members there had been too little reflection and reform in the party with respect to a changing society. Prejudices in “people’s heads” were not sufficiently and not structurally challenged (SPD)
- A difference between the local, federal state and national levels: one interviewee experienced some politicians at the national level as “not very practical”, who no longer came out their “spaceships” (E5)
- Overall, parties were described as organizations in which you had to speak out and assert yourself in order to gain any power. “When someone up front calls out: I’ve got cake here, then you have to respond immediately with: and I’ve got the right fork to eat it” (E2)
- Grassroots procedures in which a simple member could get directly involved were perceived as positive (e.g. tabling amendments), as they gave the individual the feeling of co-determination (Green Party)
- The party was described positively as a “family” in which members felt “assimilated”, experienced the “social environment” very positively and found “many friends” (E3, E5, E10)

10. Immigrants as postholders in political parties (representation and participation)

10.1. **Evaluation of the political participation of migrants – reasons for the low level of party political engagement of people with a migration background**

First and foremost the interviewees found it problematical that there were no points of contact between the parties and migrants, and that due to the parties’ lack of openness, people with MB keep their distance from the parties. This distance is reflected in a lack of interest and curiosity or even “a fear of crossing the threshold” (E14) among migrants. Manifold reasons were given for this ranging from level of education, command of German, milieu or socialization linked to their country of origin, to demotivating experiences of discrimination with German authorities, the feeling of not being a part of Germany, a lack of time or the general unattractiveness of the parties.\(^{28}\) Furthermore, many interviewees spoke of a connection between a sense of belonging and an interest for politics and party-political engagement. Therefore only those migrants (from the 2nd generation in particular) who are “integrated” and “are involved in the life of the country” (E30), have “arrived” in Germany (E20), feel they are part of German society and regard Germany as their “homeland” would be actively involved in parties (E7, E8, E13, E15, E20, E29, E30, FG1, FG2).

\(^{28}\) Representatives of MO broached the problem of migrants often distancing themselves from parties as a result of their experiences of discrimination by (immigration) authorities, whom they perceive as representatives of the state.
Migrants from Eastern Bloc countries tend to be less political, as in their country of origin they were often socialized in an atmosphere in which social sanctions were taken against political engagement. On the other hand, members of the Turkish Diaspora (of the first generation) are generally more political, however more with regard to Turkey (e.g. policy on Kurds) and were less interested in the internal politics of Germany.

One interviewee felt that in addition to many other factors certain political events can lead either lead to the politicization of people or the very opposite:

“Because I believe that political engagement is also linked with many other factors – with the family environment, level of education, professional career, sometimes with personal ambitions, with ... with the area of town, with the region. Everything plays a role and time, too, of course. It could be that some national or international crisis leads to a wave of politicization, where suddenly an above-average number of young people get interested in politics and join political parties...” (E3)

It was also pointed out that the strategic placement of role models was “important symbolic politics” that could contribute to the motivation of people, and of young people in particular, and to increasing the political participation of migrants (FG2, E8, E11).

On the other hand, the parties, as organizations, had not really been modernized or developed and are therefore conservative in their structure. This makes them unattractive and “too dry” or boring for everyone (both with and without MB). Most of the interviewees believed that the low level of political participation was a problem affecting all of society / a social problem, as mechanisms of social exclusion result in only the elite, such as teachers and lawyers, sitting in parliament (FG2, E5, E15, E22): “That’s right, our democracy is simply not at all representative” (FG2).

In addition, migrants often perceived political parties as alien organizations, as they developed no instruments to counteract the existing mechanisms of marginalization and did not actively reach out to migrants:

“It’s about... people not having the feeling that this party is also my party. It’s perceived as a German party, as a foreign organization, a foreign unit... An instrument of positive discrimination is missing. Actively going to the people, opening up to them, making them welcome and offering them opportunities – this is all missing. Instead the parties operate by and large – of course there are positive examples, too – as they did 40 or 50 years ago.” (E4)

According to many of the MO representatives and some of the politicians, parties, as a reflection of society, are not discrimination-free areas and are therefore “just as racist or non-racist as society is” (FG2):

“... our society is not free of discrimination, and the issue of anti-discrimination touches on the most varied ... the whole of society and its institutions, and the SPD, too, is not... not... we’re 150 years old, we’re also sometimes a bit old-fashioned. I don’t want to say that discrimination takes place, but I just think we’re so old-fashioned, even in terms of certain procedures and the like. In that respect I can understand that above all young people can find it all a bit too boring and dry to take part.” (E5, politician without MB)

One politician with MB and a representative of a migrant organization regarded it as a serious problem that, due to manifold experiences of discrimination or negative experiences with German authorities, many migrants had lost interest in participation or had been “intimidated” by the structures within the party. Furthermore, although a few had already been politically active, many lacked the self-confidence to present themselves in public. Finally, many said they would distance them-
selves from party-political engagement for fear of being used as a vote catcher and not really being helped to build a political career.

“then something important was said, which I really want to lend my support to: In all parties and I’ve worked together with a lot of them: intimidation is an important keyword. Many allow themselves to be intimidated very quickly by the procedures, party sessions, wording of applications / motions, presentation – and if on top of that your German is not so fluent and you get mimicked etc. – anyway, that exists without exception.” (Representative of a MO)

„Many also say: they only need me for the vote, the migrant vote. I’ve heard that many times. People have approached me and said: you’re just being exploited by your party to gain votes from migrants. You’re not going to gain any particular position, anyway. You hear that, as well. That’s the way people think. That’s the way the voters think.” (E9)

One representative of a MO outlined in detail how she (in traditional Pakistani-Indian dress) and a girlfriend wearing a headscarf were completely ignored by political parties canvassing for members at the law faculty of a university in Germany and how she has reacted by keeping her distance from the information stands:

“It’s alien to me, no one tried to bring it closer to me, even when I was a law student or when I was at school ... The CDU, the SPD, what politics is ... nobody brought these things to me. I was not spoken to by anyone on the party stand. Not even as I stood there alone, when everyone else had gone. Then I didn’t want to go to them and out of spite I didn’t even want to get any information about them (laughs).” (Representative of MO)

The restrictive naturalization legislation and the associated limited opportunities for political party engagement were also described as sizeable hurdles. Those in our sample who had joined a party as third-country nationals experienced these hurdles as demotivating, even if in some cases they had been able to take up important positions within the party. One interviewee who had been involved in an events forum for third-country nationals (regular meetings for residents) reported that the lack of opportunities for full participation in the political system in Germany would prevent many third-country nationals from joining a party at all, even though they were very interested in politics.

“If you don’t possess German citizenship, you can’t really be properly engaged in a political party. That’s simply how it is. You might be able to take part, but you won’t be able to make a difference.” (E9)

10.2. Interest of political parties in involving people with a migration background, dealing with their own diversity structure and with racism within the party

Party interest in Intercultural Opening (ICO)

None of our interviewees (except for the representatives of MOs) doubted that the parties were generally interested in involving people with a MB in their political work. They believed that the parties had understood that in view of demographic change this section of the population was “to be taken seriously” if they wanted to achieve success in elections and would therefore approach migrants “proactively”.

After all, as the party workers argued, a party is required “always to reflect society in its membership” (E18). It is a kind of duty for parties to approach migrants and to represent them as well (E11, E13, E14 = politicians with and without a MB from smaller parties). The parties therefore found themselves in a “process of change” (E28), “docking points” and “places” need to be created in the structures, so that this “particular group also has the chance to bring in their interests and thematic
interests, and most importantly, not just on issues of integration and migration, but on all issues! This is important to “give more emphasis on the way they see things” (E28).

This has at least already enjoyed a lot of success in the city states, where the chances for people with a MB in the parties, or rather in some parties, have been improved so much that under-representation has been starkly reduced (E14/E23/E25/E30). The emergence of internal party networks and WGs is seen moreover as an increasing sign of ICO in the parties (E24). One MO representative did not believe that the parties were opening up on the grounds of democratic theory, but rather that they were motivated by “strategic considerations” (FG2).

A clear leadership plan is important for such a process (E8, E7, FG2) and personalities like Klaus Wowereit (mayor of Berlin), who “authentically” promote a general change of attitude (climate of mutual recognition and tolerance, diversity as enrichment) and ICO in the party by repeatedly pronouncing the following core statements:

*People, respect every individual whatever their culture, religion, origins, persuasions, and by giving this respect you can expect others to respect your differences, if that is what you so wish. That is the basis of a peaceful co-existence in a diverse democratic society (E23).*

This understanding has found increasing acceptance in Berlin society, which as one politician said is why the chances for migrants, who are regarded as a driving force and source of enrichment, are already very good in some parties.

With the integration “future workshop” Klaus Wowereit gave a positive impetus for the SPD and created a basis for productive debate within the party, which has generated “sensitivities” for many issues and led to mobilization within the party (E27, E28). After all, there is a need to deal with certain conflicts “representatively in the party, too”, for which reason it is also important to conduct debates controversially “in order to identify the lines of conflict” in the area of integration policy and find solutions for them.

All told, however, the process will take time, as parties are “always a bit sluggish” and ICO is not possible “overnight” (E18, E28), and “resistance” always rears its head now and again. Nonetheless, many interviewees felt confident that ICO was taking a positive course in their party.

**Barriers to Intercultural Opening (ICO) in the parties**

However, many of the interviewees with a MB were not convinced that parties are really prepared to break up their internal power structures to make way for this demographic group in the their ranks and therefore remove a few barriers, because day-to-day political life is too much of a “competitive business” (E4) (cf. chapter 2.4 welcoming culture) in which no-one is prepared to give up a piece of their power (E7, E17, E20, E21). Although diversity does exist in many parties “this diversity is not necessarily present in the upper echelons” (E28).

“*Well I have to be flexible in my life and those with responsibility should also be prepared to give up some of their power to someone else, right? It’s a question of power*” (E6)

This opinion was shared by another party worker:

“*In reality, this partly entails a change in the organizational structure. And if I have a problem somewhere, then usually, if people have been doing things in the same way for 30 or 40 years and someone else comes along and says they aren’t really getting anywhere here. They have always been doing it this way and also think it’s okay. And I can find absolutely no way of breaking in.*”(E17)
Whereas most of the party workers assume that in their party there is “sensitivity among the main protagonists for adapting policy and also the staffing of offices that they have in accordance with it” (E28), one of them pointed out that it would make sense, however, to introduce a quota in order to guarantee sustainable ICO. Then ultimately something like pushing through agreements on objectives is dependent on “business situations”, that is to say on certain chairpersons and other disseminators (E18).

Finally, a party event today on the subject of ICO is “not just hype on demand” and ultimately one topic among many:

“Either because the problem doesn’t exist at all, I think, or because no-one wants to tackle it or because in reality it’s not so high on the list of priorities. A pot-pourri. And ... in reality this whole question of integration is an issue competing with energy policy, local authority finances, or who will be the next candidate for mayor. Just like women’s issues, since reunification it’s been pushed into the background” (E16).

A similar problem was alluded to by MO representatives and some politicians with a MB: although to some extent ICO has been agreed on in the party, there are deficits in it’s implementation, as among other things the internal lobby would do too little to push it through. Additionally, it was clearly the case in all parties that politicians with a MB would be nominated, who after a short time would leave the political arena again:

“The main problem is that we’re under pressure, so we quickly look for people who, however, have no experience in a party, who have no basis in the party, who so to speak can be shot down for making just a small mistake” (E27).

Some interviewees criticized the parties’ efforts with regard to ICO as inadequate and that they only open up for competitive reasons. There was therefore often only one politician with a MB in place, but no chance for any others and it was often the case that people with a MB were only given a place on the list with any prospects as a “token candidature” (E6).

They also believed that migrant quotas became tokenistic as soon as politicians were nominated who were not denoted as migrants and those denoted as migrants where left in the cold: 29

“And that’s when I feel somebody's really taking me for a ride! Because, of course, I’m talking about people who are tagged as having a MB and who’re discriminated against because of it and are at a disadvantage! Of course they have to sit there, right? And not a white half American, half Austrian, that you wouldn't recognize, not even from the name, as a migrant, right? And that gets caricatured and people are aware of this ... and then added to this you get things like Sarrazin and Buschkowsky of course, and these tiny bits of puzzle just don’t form any kind of picture of the SPD, where, in all honesty, you feel welcome.” (E7)

As a result of the often only half-hearted attempts at ICO it was felt that the potential of many people with a MB were left unrecognized and unexploited:

“I believe that it’s like this in the parties – no-one gives a thought anymore as to what potential people with MB might have and which could be used in political work... That means that ICO of the parties is the main issue and I don’t think that it’s come very far.” (E10)

“Well, when I make an issue of something, I have to ensure that I reach some kind of end result! And one that is as progressive as possible! I’m introducing the issue, because I really want to win over the migrants, don’t I? If I introduce this issue, then send it crashing against the wall and this is also accompanied first by Sarrazin and then by Buschkowsky, that’s crazy! And I’m sorry, but what am I to expect then?” (E7)

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29 Denoted as a migrant refers to people who due to their appearance (skin colour, hair and eye colour), their name and / or their accent are regarded as migrants by others.
Primarily the larger parties would insist that the careerists endured the “hard slog” of starting in local authority politics (E8, E27).

“It just doesn’t work in our party, that someone says, especially not when they say it themselves, I am now a migrant, find a place for me somewhere” (E8)

Some interviewees made it clear that in general structural as well as institutional discrimination throughout society contributed to migrants being excluded from party business and that racial prejudices among party colleagues caused politicians with a MB to have to prove themselves constantly, which they felt was very “draining”.

“On the other hand, we have structures in the party which have manifested themselves strongly over the years and no-one gives up their position willingly; on the contrary it is a competitive business ... There’s a certain kind of competition, possibly prejudices, too, concerning people with a migration background. I too have the feeling that you’ve always got to assert yourself, and that you’ve always got to prove that you’ve got abilities, and possibly more than those without a migration background, in order to find a place and fight for it - that takes a lot of energy.” (E4)

One interviewee without a MB also doubted that their party rank and file had the intercultural competence for true ICO (E8) and another interviewee without a MB openly admitted that he himself had certain reservations (25). In his local association no-one was prepared to integrate “Turkish or Muslim people whose “Islamic” disposition was recognizable “externally” (“goatie beard”, “headscarf”). This interviewee’s statements contain references to constructions of exclusion which are also to be found in the Sarrazin debate and which make it clear that particularly people with a Muslim appearance are faced with many barriers in the German democratic party system.

Handling diversity within the parties

A further interviewee without a MB said that as district chair he was charged with “decelerating” and “steering” the “diversification process” in all its forms. “Processes of change” had to remain “understandable” so that resistance among the autochthonous member base did not become too great. In his own district association there had been a “sudden influx” of people with a MB in order to strengthen the position of a candidate with a MB, whereupon inquiries were made and it was proved that the new members had dummy addresses. There had been similar “difficulties” among members “with a homosexual background” (E24).

“Perhaps I would behave in the same way. Because as someone who has also fought a lone battle against everyone and tried to organize a base in a group, I can understand that when you are suddenly alone and want to assert your own political interests, need more people and try to organize it somehow ... And the same thing as district chair, how I deal with it, slow the process down a little. It can work like that, but not within two years. No-one in the department understands that. I have the same thing, of course, with other groups that get together” (E24).

Several interviewees told us about similar fears of foreign infiltration and being overrun in their parties (E17, E18, E25):

“So when someone arrives here and brings ten new people and they also all look different somehow, there’s something wrong, they’re up to something. So you do indeed also come across people who have a different culture, in their behaviour, do I play along now or not or does a whole group join in, a lot of people don’t distinguish that. They are more inclined to say, we’ll block them. And then come the complaints.” (E17)
Furthermore, one district chair told us about inter-ethnic conflicts that were brought into the party by party members with a Turkish, Greek or Armenian background who had divided opinions on identity policy and that were only ended when the conflicting members left the party again (E24). Therefore, as one party member believed, if you want to pursue strategic ICO in the party, you have to “very precisely embrace” the heterogeneity of the various migrant communities, which is “still very much a problem in the party” (E17).

Overall, many migrants had brought a different understanding of political engagement, parties and politics and other “political cultures” into the parties and as a result “worlds were colliding” that needed to be “adapted” or “reconciled” (E16, E18, E24, E25). There is also the joint entry into the party as a group which is met with great scepticism. This does indeed occur in the autochthonous population, but would also be stopped by the party:

“I think that has happened with German members, of course. I could describe a case where at the nomination of a candidacy for the Bundestag all of the employees of a company joined the SPD; which was a bit conspicuous, because they all paid €2.50 and it all came from the same account. At which point you can say, listen, that’s not on. So, it’s no criticism of foreigners - that can also happen in Germany, especially when it’s about functions where money can be earned. For that reason we always have to ensure that things go differently. But when of course, in certain circles and in Turkish associations, but among the Alawis too, as there is another mentality, that when the chairman says I’ve joined up, you hundred come with me and join up, too. Then that is of course a different understanding of the party system from the one we have. Therefore you cannot say that everything is down to the lack of a welcoming culture, but rather that the opposite must apply, too. We therefore want people to join as individuals, on their own initiative, not because some group leader tells them to do so. E18

Interestingly, one MO representative made reference to the diversity of the “party cultures”. He would prefer, however, to see more “orientalism” in German politics, more emotion and less objectification (FG2, E27).

Dealing with racism

Even though not all interviews call it racism as such, many spoke of “prejudices” and of a certain kind of “stereotyped thinking” which automatically assigns politicians with MB to “pure” integration and migration policy as one area with which no election can be won, as this is regarded as one of society’s side issues:

“even in my party people say … XXX, he can only work in migration, he can’t win any big prizes.” (E10)

The issue of racism within one’s own party – according to two of our interviewees – is not taken seriously enough. In fact, politicians who drew attention to it were bullied, were no longer supported by the executive committee, the relevant chairperson would “sweep the issue under the table”, or would declare publicly that they wanted to have nothing to do with it.

“It’s as if I had stolen the votes from the Germans through my candidature, because after all, the Turks just vote for the Turks... This means that a long-serving SPD man won’t be joining the town council and … yes ... that’s a bit degenerate... I had just called for a committee meeting and then one of these people uttered the words: “Anyway, it’s a disgrace that Turks are sitting in the Bundestag these days.” (E2)

30 The members’ department of this party reported that they are mainly contacted by party members who are surprised at the way People of Turkish origin behave when joining the party. Although the department addresses disappointed members under the heading of „management of leavers“ in a „structured“ way there have been no complaint of discrimination from members received by the headquarters (E17).
10.3. **Function of politicians with a MB in political parties**

Politicians with MB are often approached or considered as “representatives of migrants” and as representatives of issues relating to integration policy. In reply to the question, who in their party represents the interests of migrants and what issues had been assigned to them, both politicians with and without MB said they spoke of feeling a connection between personal (migration) background and a political association with the issue of integration. Almost all of the politicians with MB that we interviewed had had to at least “handle” the issue of integration during their political career (see chapter “issues”). Reactions to this differ: individuals fight against this allocation of issues, and a large proportion of the interviewees accept this allocation and regard it, at least for the time being, as unavoidable. The vast majority of the politicians with MB reported being regarded time and time again and in various contexts as representatives of migrants and their interests. In some cases the roles are allocated by colleagues (see chapter “issues”/“representation of interests”, discrimination of competition see “nomination procedures”), but also by the electorate, by migrants themselves and through the media.

“You are not only allocated a particular area by the party or parliamentary group, but also by migrants themselves. Migrants and migrant organizations [in the region] view us as their representatives. We’re therefore allocated this bridge-builder and intermediary function by both sides. And that’s a challenge, because the demands, tasks and structure in politics are what they are, and the migrant organizations and people there have certain expectations, and there we have to be careful that we don’t give the impression that we’ve tried to fulfil these expectations or can fulfil them.” (E4)

In fact, many politicians with a MB realize that they have this bridge-building function with groups of potential voters with a MB. On a positive note, some interviewees reported that more people with a MB were coming to events, were taking an interest in politics and, for example, were visiting the party’s election campaign stand:

“... it was really good for the party at the campaign stand (laughs). Having potential voters there who actually have a German passport and they come to the stand. I’ve heard that from friends in the party that otherwise, no-one with a MB or of Turkish origin comes to [one of my party’s] campaign stands. But now we have several people — including women in headscarf, for example, who can hardly speak German, so speak to me in Turkish. They look at me, already know me, know that I speak Turkish. I think my language is also advantage, too.” (E9)

A large number of the interviewees referred to the role-model aspect of politicians with a MB. This was mentioned especially with regard to how people with a MB can become interested in politics and in party work. There was occasional reference to politicians with a MB in influential positions in the party being an “important sign” showing that the party was championing diversity in society.

Despite these often positively described functions, many interviewees with a MB emphasized that they did not want to be “reduced to this role”. One politician described a conflict at the beginning of his career, whereby he did not want to be the representative of individual groups, but in reality often acted as a mediator between these groups and his party, which was not only supported by (potential) voters, but also by party colleagues.

When politicians with a MB are ethnicized and become representatives of certain ethnic groups, various sides either place expectations on them or ascribe certain attributes to them. Many were extremely critical of these manifold expectations. One interviewee asserted that the advancement of people with a MB in the parties is always associated with the “expectation that they are disseminators in their communities” (Representative of a MO). In one case a party committee recruited someone from the Turkish community in order to make the party’s integration policy seem more credible,
which was in turn criticized by representatives of the African community. Two interviewees reported that they strictly rejected a bridging function to MOs that had been assigned to them and deliberately did not want to nurture network contacts or be on committees related to migration issues. One interviewee reported on his ethnicization by the internal party competition that had accused him of being elected only on the grounds of his ethnicity. (“Turks vote for Turks”). As a result, the politician deliberately turned to the Turkish community to do campaign work there.

10.4. Representation of the interests of voters with a MB and representation of migrants’ interests in general

Who represents the interests of migrants? Like all other citizens migrants differ in their political persuasions and level of interest depending on various personal or socio-cultural factors and not just their migration background. Of these factors, MB is a variable which – in certain contexts and in connection with legal, ethnic or social factors – can influence the similarities and differences in political interests. The representatives from MO that we interviewed highlighted matters of (dual) citizenship, asylum and refugees, immigration law and rights of residence, as well as dealing with racism as being among these often divisive topical issues (FG II).

When asked directly who in society represents the interests of “migrants” (without the interviewer having mentioned these), the majority of the politicians with and without a MB believed that they were represented by political parties in general and by their own parties in particular. Some politicians emphasized that these issues were, however, not a main concern of their parties. One politician said that he understood it as task of parties in a democratic system to organize and portray the interests of social groups:

“Parties are there to ... organize societal interests and ultimately to ensure that the groups come to a consensus in this democracy on how we want to organize society. And ... the parties in an immigration country like Germany [...] are required to organize the interests of migrants. [...] the parties are the first ones that should be portraying and organizing societal groups, political ideas, persuasions and idea groups. That is their role in a democracy.”(E13)

There was no agreement among the politicians without a MB that we interviewed about who, which persons or internal party group, represented the “interests of migrants”. Two politicians stressed explicitly that in their party, the interests of migrants are also represented by politicians that had no MB and that for their party overall the interests of migrants was an important aspect (E14, E15). The majority of the politicians we interviewed (with and without a MB) believed, however, that in their parties, it was mainly politicians with a MB who were regarded by other party members, the electorate (with and without a MB) and the wider public (e.g. the media), as the representatives of “migrant” interests (E 4, E 6, E 7, E 8, E 9, E 10, E 12, E 19, E 20, E 21, E 22, E 23, E 24, E 26). Some politicians stated that there were also predominantly politicians with a MB within the parties who took care to put issues of “migrant” interest on the party agenda (E 21, E 22, E 23). Many politicians with a MB also spoke about this function of being perceived as the representative of migrants’ interests by both party colleagues and (migrant) voters (cf. Chapter “Function”). The internal party working group on the issue (e.g. AG Vielfalt = Diversity WG) is understood as a representative of migrant interests:

“It is an internal party lobby, if you like, comparable with the [...] AG 60+ working group which represents senior citizens and of course wants to change policy for their own benefit. [...] And this kind of lobbying – the term has a bit of a negative connotation, but it’s something like that anyway – is carried out by the migrants too, of
course, but they are, as I see every time, they are fully integrated and accepted with their interests in the party. However, progress must be made in the state institutions, but they’re a long way off from that.” (E23)

Some politicians with a MB criticized the lack of a sufficient lobby for migrants in their party:

“There must be a platform ... and I have of course seen that within [my party], because they have always said ‘We do something for the migrants!’ Really? ‘We make integration happen.’ But what do we do? I have to call others in, so that they can express themselves, and then develop plans as a party.” (E6)

MO representatives hold differing opinions about who represents the interests of migrants. With regard to the aforementioned “classic” migrant interests, political parties would “at least try” to represent them according to their manifesto and position in the political system (conservative, left etc.). One FG participant criticized the parties’ representation of these issues as being “still from a dominant point of view” (FG II).

“There’s nothing there that appeals to me directly, where I say, okay, I’ll go for that, and that really is their priority. ... well, in the meantime, a lot of people have agreed on, okay, perhaps we should bring dual citizenship into the manifesto. De facto a recent study carried out by the German Institute for Human Rights revealed that the “Optionspflicht” (option obligation) contravenes [current legislation]. You can applaud this and say, yes, they’ve added it to their manifesto, but de facto it is a matter of course for which I am somehow not grateful and where I do not say yeah, my interests are represented here (FG II)

Some MO representatives were disappointed that the above-mentioned issues of “migrant” interest were often not pressed home in negotiations (e.g. coalition negotiations), played a minor role or too little priority was given to them. Ultimately, these issues remained niche issues for the parties (FG II, E 27).

On the question of the “interests of migrants” in political parties, some MO representatives believe that the issue of racism should be dealt with more rigorously. In this respect some of the MO representatives spoke of their experiences of discrimination on the basis of their ethnicity and of racism in their daily lives:

“Well I’m an atheist, but I’ve never felt more Muslim than I have in recent years. So someone simply comes along and starts to defend Islam and everything surrounding it, do they? And they mean me, even though I’m not a practising Muslim. Talk about sensitivity for terminology, eh? When they say ‘racially motivated attacks on a six-year-old girl in Neukölln’ ... A six-year-old girl? Is she a foreigner? Eh? Well, politicians have to use a bit more sensitivity in their choice of terminology as well. Xenophobia too. That starts at school. My son comes home and says, ‘Yeah, the teacher said you foreigners are a cheeky lot.’ I ran to school straight away with a Duden dictionary in my hand. ‘Well, what does “foreigner” mean? ... Is my son a foreigner?’ Or: ‘Draw your national flag.’ So he draws the German flag. ‘You haven’t understood the homework properly.’ And this sort of thing happens every day.” (FG II, participant of Turkish origin)

In the opinion of the MO representatives the political parties should place racism higher on the political agenda, and with more differentiation, because, as one interviewee put it: “it really does put its stamp on my daily life and creates both accesses and barriers, etc.” This should be understood as a “phenomenon affecting the whole of society” and not as a “peripheral phenomenon” which is dealt with in a WG. We should come to an understanding “that also affects white party members, too, who have to feel responsible, must take a stand and take up a position on the issue.” (Participant FG II).

“What is the party’s position on racism and how does it communicate that racism does not equal right-wing extremism, but is a concept with an entire theory behind it, which is completely misused and misquoted in the mainstream, and that parties somehow should be agenda-setters too, when it comes to explaining what racism really is.” (Participant FG II)
Some MO representatives speculate about why many issues which are of great relevance to people with a MB only play a rather subordinate role in political discourse. Some of the representatives believe that major parties in particular did not want to lose their loyal voters: “Even a Sarrazin has his place in a major party”, according to one MO representative whose theses, according to opinion polls, are shared by many voters of the major parties (FG II). One MO representative saw a “dilemma” for parties:

“The more they open up [for migrants], the more they have a problem with their traditional clientele, who, in truth, do not want this to happen, right? [...] this is a clear conflict of aims, really. ... And that is exactly the reason why this is given a low profile at election time.” (FG II)

One MO representative thinks that certain issues are not discussed in public by the parties, but dealt within internally in order to give no room to right-wing populist arguments and avoid “adding grist to the mill” of one-dimensional right-wing parties:

“ [...] against the background of a large part of the population holding views that we all do not like, it becomes a forum for such parties and we must look at Scandinavia or indeed any of the European countries around us, which all have some kind of relatively large right-wing populist parties, whereas in Germany the situation is actually relatively good. And this is due to some extent that the issue does not play a major part in elections. Because they say let’s keep the ball on the floor, otherwise we’ll have another Sarrazin in our midst, and we all know what would happen then. ... As far as I understand it, that’s another reason why they say, okay, we’ll deal with this internally, rather than arguing about it on the public stage.” (FG II)

This approach was viewed as problematic by the MO representatives, because it would not solve the problem of latent racism in a society. One politician without a MB believed that it was the remit of parties such as the major party, for which he is the elected representative, to try to

“... influence social development with reforms and emancipatory approaches ... We must be the catalyst of social development and bring the knowledge we have to the core of society, in order to make this knowledge command a majority / capable of consensual assent.” (E 23)

Many of the MO representatives also mentioned the meaning of symbolic action and “signs” designed either positively to give migrants the feeling that “their” interests are being represented by a party, or negatively, so that migrants feel disappointed and not represented by a party. They mentioned a few prominent examples from recent years, such as the exclusion, or rather the non-exclusion of a party member who in his prominent position had made racist comments (see above: Sarrazin), heads of state declaring their belief that Islam is a part of Germany, readings from the Koran by a Muslim Bundestag candidate, or the Chancellor’s statements on integration:

“[She said] multiculti has failed, exactly. That is a symbol. Whoosh, full stop. That sticks in your mind. They say, okay, multiculti has failed. We have failed, we don’t belong here. ... it’s quite clearly about the corridors of power, the kind of things they say.” (Participant FG II)

For many interviewees, the positions taken by parties in areas relevant to migrants, the way issues of daily life and environment, which affect many migrants, are dealt with, as well as positive or negative signs of belonging are of great significance regarding the extent to which migrants feel represented by the political parties. Of the 11 MO representatives we interviewed, not one felt sufficiently represented by political parties.

31 Guido Sarrazin is a former Bundesbank Board Member and well-known member of a large German political party who published a book containing racially discriminative views on Turks and Arabs; see [http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/un-anti-racism-committee-reprimands-germany-over-sarrazin-comments-a-895247.html](http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/un-anti-racism-committee-reprimands-germany-over-sarrazin-comments-a-895247.html)
The migrant representatives saw the MOs as representing the interests of migrants. Depending on their own particular definition, the organizations represent certain groups or group interests. The interviewees saw the need to form stronger networks and to show themselves in a stronger light to make progress on divisive issues such as discrimination. The chairman of a Turkish MO said:

"We regard ourselves as an organization representing people’s interests, plus recently as a human rights organization. Because we have seen that we cannot make progress only through the representation of our own interests, meaning those of Turks or migrants in Germany, without forming alliances. And the future of the democratic movement in Germany no longer lies in the unions, charities, or Churches. They have been very much left behind in this democracy movement: they are losing members; they are no longer capable of mobilization. The future movement will be a human rights movement: the Turkish community, the Central Council of Jews, the Central Council of German Sinti and Roma, the Lesbian and Gay Association, the Associations of the Homeless, Women’s Councils, Women’s Associations. That is the future of the democracy movement in Germany. (E27)"

11. Representation and participation of third-country nationals (TCN) in party politics

A large part of the interviewees both with and without immigrant background regard third-country nationals (TCN) as not sufficiently represented in politics. One reason for this was given as the “restrictive naturalization legislation” (E 10), which generally disallows dual citizenship (with increasing exceptions\(^{32}\)) and the resulting lack of voting rights for 5.7% of the population which represents a “democratic deficit” (E 3). Many interviewees believed that, in general, TCN are not able to participate sufficiently in politics or help to shape them.

Some interviewees argued vehemently for dual citizenship – the construction of German nationality law must be opened (E 13) – and/or for the right to vote in local authority elections TCN permanently residing in the country\(^{33}\). This restricted legal position was seen by many politicians with and without a MB as being directly connected to the low level of participation of TCN in political parties (E3, E6, E13, E18, E19, E21, E23, E29, E30).

“If someone is excluded from the outset they will of course have no interest in being actively involved in politics. If I grow up here and still do not have citizenship and I am not even allowed to vote, then I have little motivation to do anything in that area” (E 30).

As already described, third-country nationals (without German citizenship) have no active or passive voting rights in Germany. They can, however, become members of a party (in the CDU and FDP as long as they have been living in the country for three years) and take up positions within the party (e.g. secretary). They may not, however, hold a mandate or (legally) vote for representatives and delegates. One party (the Green Party) affords participation to third-country nationals in spite of this legal restriction, by carrying out two rounds of voting: at the first one, all party members may participate regardless of their citizenship; in the second, the vote is legally validated by delegates (see chapter “nomination procedures”).

\(^{32}\) [www.dw.de/dual-citizenship-plan-leaves-turks-disappointed/a-17258643](http://www.dw.de/dual-citizenship-plan-leaves-turks-disappointed/a-17258643)

\(^{33}\) These political demands correspond to the political positions of many of the parties’ politicians participating in the sample. The Social-Democrats (SPD), the Green Party (Bündnis 90/Grüne) and the Liberals (FDP) have corresponding positions concerning the allowance of double citizenship and local voting-rights for non-EU-nationals. However the Christian-Democrats (CDU/CSU) who are the largest parliamentary group have more restrictive positions on double citizenship and local voting-rights.
Some politicians with a MB had already joined their party before obtaining German citizenship. In some cases, they considered their desire to participate in party politics and / or to stand for election had been a key reason for acquiring citizenship (E 3, E 6, FG II).

On the other hand one MO representative and politicians with and without a MB thought that the motivation to become involved in a political party was even lower among TCN, as they were not able to elect a representative within the party (FG II, E 3, E 18, E 21).

“Of course that makes party work a little unsatisfying, because the highest aim in party work is of course gaining mandates, taking part in government elections, active or passive (E 18).

“when people have the feeling they can do a bit within the party, but in the end my vote counts for less at the decisive moment than anyone else’s, that is of course not a nice feeling. That offends a person’s sense of justice (E 21).

When asked who represented the interests of TCN, in particular as they have no voting rights and cannot vote for a political representative of their interests, some politicians said they saw themselves subjectively as the representatives of those with no voting rights:

“Everyone who lives in my constituency and contacts me, and has a problem – I don’t care what kind of passport they have – I would feel subjectively that I am their member of parliament, even if they cannot perform the act of voting”(E 26).

Some politicians said that they, or their party, were actively in contact with MO, visited associations and organizations in order to be able to represent their interests and the interests of those without voting entitlement.

The representatives of MOs that we interviewed mostly had a different view on the issue of representation of the interests of third-country-nationals (FG I, FG II, E 27. They viewed civil society organizations much more as the representatives of TCNs interests and believed that “for most parties” migrants only then become interesting when they become voters.”

Several interviewed immigrant representatives feel that they themselves have to formulate their interests and articulate them in the forums that are available to them. Exclusion from political co-determination processes and the (often experienced) lack of interest of the parties in those who (supposedly) have no voting rights do not, however, further participation.

**Good practice:**

- The inclusion of enhanced legal political rights of co-determination (membership of parties, voting rights) for TCN into the party manifesto and the implementation of this in the form of participation in the government is an example of good practice.
- The SPD’s regular meeting group was mentioned as good practice for involving people without citizenship in politics (the interviewees believed, however, that this should not only deal with issues of integration policy, but with all issues)
- Naturalization campaigns were mentioned as good practice: in Hamburg those eligible for naturalization are contacted by post and invited to start the process (“welcoming culture”)
- Nomination procedures in the parties which also grant co-determination rights to TCN and invite them to take this up (nomination procedures of the Green Party)
12. Thesis list of favourable and unfavourable factors affecting the party political participation of migrants, particularly TCN, and the ethnic diversity in political parties

**Beyond Political Parties**

*Favourable factors:*

*Unfavourable factors:*

- Authorities are not interculturally open and / or have not developed a welcoming culture in their work and in their dealings with their visitors. (cf. Thesis 8)
- The lack of integration of migrants into German society and structural disadvantages faced by migrants in German society (education/economy etc.).
- The curriculum for history and politics in schools has not been adapted to the structural changes of the immigrant community (political education). (cf. Thesis 2)

**Interest in Political Parties**

*Favourable factors:*

*Unfavourable factors:*

- Migrants are not addressed in the public arena as potential voters or participants (e.g. at campaign stand, at party information stands)

**Networks**

*Favourable factors:*

*Unfavourable factors:*

- The party politicians visit MO only before elections (cf. Thesis 4)

**Opportunities for TCN to Participate in Political Parties**

*Favourable factors:*

- TCN can become members of political parties
- Parties find a way to allow TCN to participate in the election of delegates or candidates in spite of restrictive federal legislation, e.g. by carrying out several electoral rounds (one round for everybody and a second round just for those legally entitled to vote)
- TCN can take up office within the party and participate in internal party elections (e.g. secretary, chair)
- The party offers “trial membership” (cf. Thesis 7)
- Participation in WGs, e.g. on the topic of diversity or combating racism, is also open to interested non-members (cf. Thesis 7)
Unfavourable factors:

- TCN may not take part in general elections
- TCN may not take active or passive part in party elections which are subject German voting laws (cannot therefore elect delegates and candidates at local authority, regional or national elections) (“If I cannot vote anyone into office in a party, then I fell even less like joining”).
- There are no reliable figures on party members with TCN. (Monitoring)

(Internal) Party Structures

Favourable factors:

- There are specialist internal party WGs that focus on migration/integration, diversity or Anti-racism (cf. Thesis 11)
- There are internal party WGs / commissioners who deal with the party’s ICO (cf. Thesis 11)
- Events and / or training on diversity development and / or intercultural opening are offered (cf. Thesis 11)
- There are internal party support programmes which are open to people with a MB / TCN (public speaking courses, advanced political training etc.)
- There is space for new members when drawing up the list of candidates
- When drawing up the list, the electoral committee tries to ensure that the region’s population is appropriately represented

Unfavourable factors:

- Newcomers to the party at the local level, such at the local association do not feel welcome, i.e. feel confronted with a closed group, are ignored are greeted with suspicion instead of openness
- There is no institutionalised support structure for new members, with a good reception being left to chance
- There is monitoring of members with a MB
- “Alpha males” / “top dogs” / old-boy networks dominate when drawing up the list of candidates

Politicians with a Migration Background

Favourable factors:

- Politicians with a MB are represented in important and visible positions (role model function, “symbol politics”)
- Politicians with a MB are represented at the leadership level of the party

Unfavourable factors:

- Politicians with a MB are chiefly regarded as representatives of migrants’ interests and restricted to the issue of integration policy (cf. Thesis 12)

Positions taken by the Party

Favourable factors:

- The party represents positions in its manifesto which reflect the interests of migrants and articulates them in the public arena (e.g. on immigration law, citizenship law)
• High-ranking politicians make positive comments in the public arena about diversity in society or the contribution migrants make to society

_Unfavourable factors:_

• The interests of various social groups (ethnic and religious) are played off against each other, and fears are instilled in them (especially during election campaigns)

**Addressing Diversity in the Party**

_Favourable factors:_

• There is open and honest debate within the party about its own diversity.

_Unfavourable factors:_

• Party members who complain about racist discrimination are reprimanded and the complaint is not followed up (cf. Theses 13, 24)
• (Prominent or high-ranking) party members make discriminatory comments or derogatory remarks about ethnic or religious groups
• Discriminatory remarks are not publicly challenged, and no clear boundaries are made (cf. Thesis 26)
• Leading politicians make one-dimensional negative remarks about integration/migration.
• Discrimination on the grounds of ethnic or religious belonging is not regarded as a problem affecting the whole of society, but as an (extremist) side issue. Nothing is done about the day-to-day aspect.
13. Preliminary list of recommendations to increase the party-political participation of migrants and ethnic diversity in political parties

(A) Arouse interest and politicize

1. Promotion of *empowerment of young people with a MB* in different areas of daily life (e.g. value associations; encourage youths at school to participate, support empowerment projects)

2. Stable *funding of political education projects* and *adaptation of the history and politics curricula in schools* to the structural changes in the immigrant community

3. *Politicians as disseminators* e.g. in schools, political education by members of parliament, facilitation of work experience, mentoring programmes

4. *Networks with migrant organizations*: the parties should value the work of the MOs and regard them as partners (local or political), not just seek dialogue during electoral campaigns, attend MO events, visit MO special occasions, and invite oneself to take part in dialogue. (welcoming signals)

5. Parties have to rouse the interest of migrants, but not through populism, but by making it easier to participate, because people with a MB do not feel they are able to exercise any kind of co-determination and never have.

6. *Party events about the issue of ICO* or migrants in politics or about traditional festivities such as fast-breaking at the end of Ramadan (welcoming culture).

7. *Trial and working group memberships*, through which mentoring could also be developed.

8. *Intercultural opening of the authorities and Welcoming culture in the authorities*: authorities are often perceived as representatives of the state. Some migrants have had extremely negative experiences with authorities (e.g.: immigration department, residence permits, naturalization) and consequently want to have “nothing more” to do with the state to which the parties belong. An open welcoming culture in the administration has a positive effect on the people’s interest in political participation and vice versa.

(B) Change internal party structures

9. *Welcoming culture*: People must always be made to feel they are welcome, be received with positive interest. They must be given the right to co-determination, even where the legal room for manoeuvre is limited (see nominations)

10. *Intercultural opening of all welcoming forums*: welcoming forums should not be created especially for people with a MB, they should be welcome in all forums.

11. *Specialist political networks* that deal with integration / migration policy and *networks that deal with ICO / diversity development in the party*: these forums (WGs, networks, projects) should not be run especially by people with a MB, but by interested people independent of their cultural background.

12. Interested persons with a MB and *politicians with a MB should not* automatically be restricted to their MB and *made to work on the issues of integration policy* or be regarded as networkers / bridge-builders to MOs.

13. *Recognize and exploit the potential and points of view* of people with a MB, especially for *sensitization within the party to diversity development* (e.g. on the grounds of individual experiences of discrimination). Example: individual members of parliament who drew atten-
tion to discrimination within the party were given warnings. On the contrary, the party (executives) should treat such criticism positively and use it to challenge existing practices and opinions.

14. **Cooperation of the party school and welcoming forums** in the development of sensitization strategies and diversity competences, or for support programmes for interested persons with a MB.

15. **Briefing, intercultural training or diversity training for all levels of the executive committee** (also local associations, party-affiliated organizations, WGs, networks) on diversity sensitization.

16. Support for **interculturally sensitive structures at the base**, in which members with a MB feel they are taken seriously, they have opportunities open to them and feel valued.

17. **Introduction of a monitoring system** as a basic requirement for the evaluation of personal diversity development (at least at the member-of-parliament level or on the basis of information about member registration, member questionnaire or possibly additional data gathering).

18. **Breaking up established power structures** and supporting structures which afford opportunities to new people and those from outside (e.g. nomination, organization of programmes / issues): The readiness must be there to change the existing power structures and grant opportunities for participation, because the people who have the power are all too unwilling to surrender it.

19. During **list compilation** and list voting it should always be pointed out that lists represent “all of society” and that candidates with a MB should be placed on the lists in proportion to their numbers in the population. This would send signals to the voters with a MB. Programmes and measures should be reviewed for this purpose (mentoring programmes, quotas, etc.)

(C) **Make use of role models, symbols and mentoring**

20. **Necessity and importance of political symbols**, which, however, only make sense if ICO is taken seriously and also carried out at the base level.

21. **Installation of role models**, then politicians with a MB in influential and conspicuous positions have an encouraging effect.

22. **Mentoring** (informal / via programmes) by politicians (with and without a MB) **to motivate and support people with a MB** with regard to current and future party political engagement.

(D) **Internal party positions on integration and discrimination**

23. It is important for all parties to address issues which concern the respective societal groups. A **party policy** which tends to be **restrictive** in respect of the needs and interests of migrants (integration issues, dual citizenship) is more likely to deter migrants from party political engagement.

24. Negative experiences with discrimination: when individual party members are **directly discriminated against by other party members** and this isplayed down, made light of and insufficiently pursued, this is a major deterrence.

25. Creation of **internal party complaint mechanisms**.

26. If the party’s executive committee does not distance itself enough from them or does not draw the necessary consequences (warnings, ejection from party etc.) then publicly announced **statements made by people within the party** which marginalize, are anti-integration, discriminatory or racist can have a very negative effect on the integrative potential of the party and deter people, especially with a MB, from the party altogether.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
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<th>Programme election '13</th>
<th>Working Groups</th>
<th>Other examples of Good Practice</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic Union (CDU)</td>
<td>Section on “integration country Germany”</td>
<td>Section on “right of way for integration”</td>
<td>No programme yet</td>
<td>German-Turkish Forum (Deutsch-Türkisches Forum)</td>
<td>Nomination of four members with a migration background for the party’s executive committee in 2012</td>
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<td>Migrants within the Union (Migranten in der Union – MIU)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Christian Social Union (CSU)</td>
<td>Section on “promoting cohesion, strengthening cultural identities and supporting integration”</td>
<td>See: CDU</td>
<td>See: CDU</td>
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<tr>
<td>Social Democratic Party (SPD)</td>
<td>Section on “managing diversity”</td>
<td>Section on “Germany needs immigration – immigration needs integration”</td>
<td>Migrants are target group and subject of several sections, specific section on “equal participation – for a modern integration policy”</td>
<td>State working groups “Migration and Diversity”</td>
<td>Quota: the share of people with a migration background in the party’s executive committee should increase to 15%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Free Democratic Party (FDP)</td>
<td>Section on “Growing together in an open society” defining the party’s view on immigration and integration</td>
<td>Section on “promoting tolerance and respect through diversity policies”</td>
<td>Section on “Living diversity – together in an open society”</td>
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<tr>
<td>Green Party (BÜNDNIS 90/ DIE GRÜNEN)</td>
<td>Preamble emphasises equality and diversity „Immigration society“ as one of the party’s key projects</td>
<td>The topic of immigration and integration can be found in the whole programme, e.g. “integration through societal participation” or “opening parties” for migrants  emphases migrants as part of all areas of society</td>
<td>Migrants are subject and target group throughout the programme; specific section on “naturalising people – from integration to inclusion”</td>
<td>Federal as well as state working groups: “Migration and Flight”</td>
<td>Comprehensive programme promoting young and new party members (though no focus on migrants) “Green Letter to the fellow citizens with a migration background” in the 2009 electoral campaign to win this group as voters Under the name of „Prospect Citizen – For A New Societal Integration Contract” (2006), the Greens laid down their view on integration and which issues to attend to – concerning both migrants and the receiving society</td>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Left Party (DIE LINKE)</td>
<td>Section on “migration and integration as a social and democratic issue – open boarders for people in need”</td>
<td>Amongst others in section on “excluding no one – a policy of social equality”</td>
<td>Amongst others in section on “Democracy for everybody who lives in this country. Equal rights for migrants”</td>
<td>Federal working group “Migration, Integration and Anti-Racism” Working group “Ethnic Minorities”</td>
<td>Appeal of the federal working group “Migration, Integration and Anti-Racism” for “promising places on the party’s list for migrants for the 2013 election” Resolution of the working group “Ethnic Minorities” concerning the promotion of national minorities in Germany, amongst others with regard to their political participation</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Source: Own investigation (CJD Hamburg + Eutin/ Pohl)

36 [http://www.die-linke.de/partei/zusammenschluesse/bagmigrationintegrationundantirassismus/](http://www.die-linke.de/partei/zusammenschluesse/bagmigrationintegrationundantirassismus/)
37 [http://www.die-linke.de/partei/zusammenschluesse/agethnischeminderheiten/](http://www.die-linke.de/partei/zusammenschluesse/agethnischeminderheiten/)
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